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The end of the Cold War created new challenges and 
opportunities for European Security. The power vacuum that 
was left by the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact needed to 
be addressed quickly and pragmatically to ensure the 
democratization of the former Eastern Block nations.  Also, 
recent developments in World Security such as increased 
Terrorism and Military Operations Other Than War have 
forced NATO and other Transatlantic Security Institutions 
to adapt to a new way of thinking, operating and 
cooperating. This thesis identifies some of the most recent 
political and security procedures of NATO, other various 
Transatlantic Security Institutions and the National Guard 
State Partnership Program to aide these nascent 
democracies. This thesis focuses on Hungarys successful 
experience of obtaining NATO membership via the Partnership 



















































TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………………………………………1 
 
II.  THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PROGRAM (PFP) AS THE  
     COMPONENT OF THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY……………………………………3 
 A. THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY………3 
     B. PFP METAMORPHOSIS………………………………………………………………………………………7 
     1. The Birth of the Partnership………………………………………………7 
         2. The Enhanced Partnership………………………………………………………12 
         3. The Enhanced and More Operational  
Partnership(EMOP)………………………………………………………………………16 
               a.  The Political-Military Framework………………17    
               b.  The Planning and Review Process…………………18 
               c.  The Operational Capabilities…………………………19 
   d.  The Training and Education Program…………20 
 C.  PFP-RELATED NATO INITIATIVES……………………………………………………21 
     1.  The Defense Capabilities Initiative………………………21 
     2.  The South East Europe Initiative………………………………22 
     D.  NATO INTEGRATION AND PFP………………………………………………………………23 
         1. The Pre-Map Period………………………………………………………………………33 
     2. The Membership Action Plan…………………………………………………26 
 E.  INTERPRETING PFP TODAY……………………………………………………………………29 
 
III.  HUNGARY AND PFP………………………………………………………………………………………………35 
A. METAMORPHOSIS OF THE HUNGARIAN NATIONAL 
SECURITY  POLICY……………………………………………………………………………………35 
 B.  HUNGARY’S INTEGRATION AND PARTICIPATION IN PFP……39 
 C.  FULFILLMENT OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS………………………………46 
 D.  STUMBLING BLOCKS OF HUNGARY’S INTEGRATION  
         (LESSONS LEARNED)…………………………………………………………………………………49 
 E.  HUNGARY’S PRIORITIES AND PERSPECTIVES OF PFP AS 
         A NATO MEMBER……………………………………………………………………………………………57 
F. HUNGARY’S CONTRIBUTION TO NATO ENLARGEMENT………………63 
 
IV.  THE STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: THE AMERICAN 
ENGAGEMENT TO COMPLEMENT THE PFP……………………………………………………71 
 A.  CREATION OF THE STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM…………………71 
 B.  CURRENT SPP OPERATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH PFP……76 
 C.  LIFE CYCLE AND FUNDING OF SPP…………………………………………………81 
 D.  MINUTEMAN EXCHANGE PROGRAM…………………………………………………………83 
E.  STATE EFFORTS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL  
         INTERESTS………………………………………………………………………………………………………85 
 
 vii
V.  THE OHIO AND HUNGARY CASE STUDY…………………………………………………………89 
 A.  HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OHIO AND  
         HUNGARY……………………………………………………………………………………………………………89 
 B.  GOVERNOR’S ROLE………………………………………………………………………………………92 
 C.  OHIO’S SPP, THE FIRST YEARS………………………………………………………93 
 D.  TARGETED TRAINING EVENTS………………………………………………………………96 
  1.  Hungarian Air Defense…………………………………………………………96 
  2.  Guard Exercises…………………………………………………………………………96 
  3.  Reorganization of the Hungarian Defense 
      Forces…………………………………………………………………………………………………97 
  4.  Chaplaincy Familiarization Visits…………………………98 
 E.  GOALS AND OBJECTIVES ACHIEVED………………………………………………100 
F. ASSESSMENT OF THE PROGRAM…………………………………………………………103 
 
VI.  A DEVELOPMENT PROSPECT……………………………………………………………………………107 
 A. DIAGNOSIS………………………………………………………………………………………………………107 
 B. RECOMMENDATIONS………………………………………………………………………………………110 
  1. PfP…………………………………………………………………………………………………………110 
   a. General Issues………………………………………………………………110 
   b. Specific Issues……………………………………………………………112 
  2. SPP…………………………………………………………………………………………………………113 
  3. MAP…………………………………………………………………………………………………………115 
 


































COOPERATION IN THE SPP I …………………………………………………………………………………127 
 
APPENDIX D 







































The Authors would like to thank Professor Abenheim for 
his encouragement assistance and his vision. In addition 
much is owed to Professor Roessler for his support and 
believing in the idea of a joint-thesis, which illustrates 
the success of both the PfP and SPP program. Finally, we 
would like to thank Professor Trinkunas for his help with 





























This thesis will identify some of the most relevant 
recent political and security procedures of the 
Transatlantic region, the North Atlantic Alliance and its 
related initiatives, the Partnership for Peace Program and 
the State Partnership Program in the Central and Eastern 
European Democratization Process. 
It focuses on the Hungarian Experience of NATO 
integration and the successful cooperation between the 
Hungarian Defense Forces and the Ohio National Guard. It 
analyzes the various strategies, programs and events and 
highlights various strategies and lessons learned for the 
future accession of current NATO candidates. 
It begins with the metamorphosis of the Transatlantic 
Security after the Cold War and reviews the role of PfP and 
SPP. Then it describes the history of the Partnership for 
Peace Program and its related initiatives. It then centers 
on the Hungarian experience and its approach to European 
Security and its role in the PfP. The State Partnership 
Program between Hungary and Ohio played a crucial role in 
Hungarys conversion to a civilian controlled military and 
successful entrance into NATO. A basic overview of the 
State Partnership Program is discussed as well as a Case 
Study of Ohio-Hungarian State Partnership Program. Finally, 
some of the major obstacles that can stall a process or 
prevent the true potential of the various cooperation 
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The times we live in are times of profound 
change, dramatic and fundamental change  
political, ideological, and technical. 
We must adopt to that change,  
and we must grow.1 
 
GEN Gordon R. Sullivan 
 
 
The end of the Cold War, in particular, opened up new 
opportunities and new challenges for European security. 
In responding to this new environment and the rich 
potential it offered for a substantially re-fashioned 
concept of security in Europe, NATO began a 
comprehensive programme of adaptation.2 
 
This thesis will identify some of the most relevant recent 
political and security procedures of the Trans-Atlantic region, 
the North Atlantic Alliance and its related initiatives, the 
Partnership for Peace Programme, as well as the impact of the 
United States State Partnership Program in the Central and 
Easter European democratization process. Meeting the requirements 
of the Alliances [North Atlantic Treaty Alliance - NATO] 
eligibility criteria has been supported by various mechanisms 
established since the mid-90s for planning, monitoring and 
assessment of the progress made towards internal reform 
implementation towards membership. These mechanisms are in the 
process of streamlining efforts and outcomes both in NATO and the 
applicant states.3 
 
Also, based on the Hungarian experiences of NATO integration 
and successful cooperation between the Hungarian Defense Forces 
                                                 
1    GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, 23 May 1993, National Intelligence Support to 
Joint Operations, Joint Pub 2-02, 28 September, 1998, p. II-1. 
2    Javier Solana, Foreword, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: A Member of NATO, 
Budapest, 1999, p. 9. 
3    NATO Membership Readiness Indicator, Methodology for Assessment of the 
Readiness of Candidate Countries to Join NATO, p. 7. 
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(HDF) and the United States Ohio National Guard, it will focus 
on desirable strategies and lessons learned for the future 
accession of the currently ten NATO candidates, in particular for 
those seven countries that were invited in Prague Summit. It will 
examine the strong societal and historical ties between Ohio and 
Hungary and their relevance to a successful SPP program. It will 
also recount the details of the birth of the partnership, its 
growth from military to military contact to one of overall 
cooperation that involves more civilian participation and 
commitment. It will look toward the future and consider the 
challenges that now lay ahead for the program, as funding becomes 
more difficult to acquire due to the success of Hungarys entry 
into NATO and new objectives for the partnership. 
 
The first chapter of the thesis summarizes the metamorphosis 
of the Transatlantic security after the Cold War and reviews the 
role of the PfP and SPP. The second chapter addresses Hungarys 
approach to the European security and role in the PfP. The third 
chapter offers an objective overview of the State Partnership 
Program and its relationship to the PfP. The fourth chapter is a 
case study of the Hungary-Ohio National Guard cooperation via the 
State Partnership Program. Finally, the fifth chapter highlights 
some of the major obstacles that can stall the process or prevent 
a smooth and seamless cooperation and makes some recommendations 
for the possible future direction of both engagement programs 
(Appendix E, Structure of the Thesis). 
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II. THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PROGRAM AS THE COMPONENT 
OF THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY 
 
History proved several times already that only 
an approach ready for cooperation may lead to  
results in meeting the challenges to security.4 
 
 
A.  THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY 
 
Transatlantic security is invisible.5 
 
William S. Cohen 
 
As the world is poised at the threshold of the 21st century, 
it is witnessing vital and dynamic changes in the new world 
order. At the end of the 80s the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and Warsaw Pact, brought the end of bipolarity with the 
accompanying demise of the Cold War while creating a precarious 
security vacuum in Eastern Europe. With that unpredictable and 
complex political avalanche, new political and economic forces 
have appeared and have started to reshape centers of power in the 
world. This new strategic environment has caused a shift in the 
worlds order and with it the U.S.s and Europes role and have 
also changed.  
 
During the decades of the Cold War security was 
predominantly a military issue. In this time of bipolarity, 
security was directly aimed at maintaining the balance of nuclear 
power and weapons of mass destruction. The two global 
superpowers played a zero-sum game, thus the national security 
of both powers was focused on the deterrent of the other.  
 
                                                 
4    Martonyi János, Német Zsolt, Hungarian Foreign Policy and Euro-Atlantic 
Integration, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: A Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 13. 
5    Cohen, William S. Preface, Strengthening Transatlantic Security, A U.S. 
Strategy for the 21st Century, December 2000, Online, 
http://www.expandnato.org/usstrategy.html (5 May 2003) 
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With the end of bipolarity the threat of a global nuclear 
war has greatly diminished to a shadow of its former self, and  
security is no longer an exclusively military matter. Non-
military factors, such as political, economic, humanitarian and 
environmental issues became more significant. Security is no 
longer defined solely as deterrence, nut now security depends on 
a flexible and dynamic interdependence and cooperation that 
encompasses more than military to military contact.  
 
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been quietly 
evolving its character from that of collective defense 
alliance to a collective security organizationthis 
transformation has been an evolution by default as 
opposed to a conscious and declared change of 
identity.6     
  
 New security challenges have appeared in the last decade, 
which are determining the new security environment. NATOs 
identity crisis stems from the fact that this new environment has 
propelled NATO missions into unchartered waters. It now has a 
range of missions from Humanitarian, intervention where no overt 
threat exists to member nations, to counter-terrorists operations 
and the binding of transitional countries to the Euro-Atlantic 
alliance. 
 
A new kind of gap is forming to exacerbate the new security 
environment. This gap is between the democratic, rich, 
prosperous, stable nations and regions, and the poor, unstable, 
corrupt, still totalitarian and feudalistic parts of the world. 
Volatile new democracies in Eastern Europe, fierce tribalism in 
Africa, civil war and ethnic violence in the Balkans, 
strengthening of the fundamentalism in the Middle-East and rise 
of terrorism and widespread famine and disease are ever growing 
concerns for world security.7 Coupled with the fact that there is 
                                                 
6  Janes Intelligence Review, Volume 14, July 7, 2002, p. 19. 
7  Vladimar Tismaneau, Nationalism, Populism and Other Threats to Liberal 
Democracy in Post Communist Europe, (Seattle, The University of 
International Studies, 1999), p. 87. 
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an ever widening gap between the wealthy nations with their 
technological advances, and the rest of the world that seems to 
be sinking ever deeper into pandemonium. What furthers this gulf 
is the rapid rise of terrorist activity couched in the rhetoric 
of nationalism, religion or ethnic purity. These groups utilize 
unprecedented means and methods to fight their so-called battles. 
The new security environment therefore is not just unpredictable 
but defense strategists have to consider all types of unforeseen 
scenarios as well. The new security risks must be addressed not 
just for the needs of the Euro-Atlantic region and NATO but for 
the sake of the entire world as well. Recent conflicts from 
Bosnia through Kosovo, Chechnya to Iraq, North Korea and 
Afghanistan, as well as the events on September 11th proved that 
security is not yet guaranteed in the world. The nations of the 
Euro-Atlantic region recognized that their security ultimately 
depends on the stability of the surrounding regions and most 
importantly strong cooperation between states.  
 
The United States has two strategic goals in Europe. The 
first is to build a Europe that is truly integrated, democratic, 
prosperous and at peace. The second goal is to work with allies 
and partners across the Atlantic to meet the global challenges no 
nation can meet alone.  
 
This means working together to consolidate this 
regions historic transition in favor of democracy and 
free markets; to support peace efforts in troubled 
regions; to tackle global threats such as environmental 
and health problems, terrorism, drug trafficking, the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction and other 
potentially dangerous technologies; and build a more 
open world economy without barriers to transatlantic 
investment.8 
 
One of the most efficient responses to bridging the growing 
gap is to build a new security architecture by establishing new, 
                                                 
8    United States European Command Theater Strategy, 2000, p. 2; On-line 
Internet, 12 December 2000, online, http://www.eucom.mil (5 May 2003)   
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strong and secure pillars of peace and by creating a community 
that can meet the challenges presented by the new security risks. 
As far as the Euro-Atlantic theater is concerned, the foundations 
of these pillars have been laid in the previous decades and the 
building process has been going on in a pragmatic way, by 
establishing and strengthening the Euro-Atlantic community. A 
significant cornerstone in the security architecture and process 
are the Partnership for Peace and the State Partnership Program.  
 
As peaceful engagement and cooperation becomes ever 
more defined as a mission of the U.S. Department of 
Defense and the European Community, the need to be able 
to engage friends and allies outside of the spectrum of 
a pure military-military level also grows.9 
 
Today we have seen the line between war and peace blur, along 
with the distinction between external and internal security 
threats10. Therefore it is imperative that the Euro-Atlantic 
Security Architecture remain viable innovative and responsive. A 
change in NATOs military doctrine, which has already shifted 
from positional defense against an identified enemy to a capacity 
for flexible deployment to areas of need11 is one of the first 
steps to addressing these issues.  
 
NATOs Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) and the U.S. 
National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) are both important 
pillars of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture and 
cooperation. The State Partnership Program and the Partnership 
for Peace Programme both involve direct military to military 
contact that focuses on building trust and cooperation between 
nations militaries that stood on opposite sides of the Cold War. 
These engagement events serve to demonstrate our commitment; 
improve interoperability, reassure allies, friends, and coalition 
                                                 
9    National Guard Bureau, Minute Man Fellows Program Concept, National Guard 
Bureau Position Paper, June 9, 1999. p. 1. 
10   Janes Intel 
11   Report to Congress on NATO Enlargement, US Department of State, February 
24, 1997, p. 2.  
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partners; promote transparency; covey democratic ideals; deter 
aggression; and help relieve sources of instability before they 
can become military crises.12  
 
The successful and unique initiatives have proven that 
peaceful engagement and cooperation are the foundation for the 
new security environment in the emerging post Cold War order. An 
examination of their achievements and strategies may  provide a 
framework for emerging democracies to emulate and provide the 
motivation to expand these types of endeavors beyond the Trans-
Atlantic sphere of influence. Bearing in mind NATOs Prague 
Summit, it is also time to review the role of the PfP, SPP and 
Membership Action Plan (MAP), both as a means of security entity 
and as a means of integration in order to understand their 
function and objectives and to evaluate their future course of 
action. 
 
B.  THE PfP METAMORPHOSIS 
The Partnership will expand and intensify 
political and military co-operation throughout  
Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to  
peace, and build strengthened relationships by 
promoting the spirit of practical co-operation  
and commitment to democratic principles.13   
 
1. The Birth of the Partnership 
 
The Atlantic Community must reach out 
to the countries of the East which 
were our adversaries in the Cold War, and 
extend to them the  hand of friendship.14 
 
The last decade of the second millennium brought some very 
pressing and unprecedented security concerns to the Trans-
                                                 
12   NATO Ministerial Communique, Annex to M-1 94 2, (1994). 
13   Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO HQ, Brussels, January 11, 
1994, Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, § 14, Joó, 
Rudolf, Hungary: a Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 1999), p. 162.  
14   NATO Summit Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, London, 
5-6 July 1990, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: a Member of NATO, (Budapest, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 159. 
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Atlantic region. Though the total East-West confrontation has 
been removed, it has not secured total peace in Europe. 
Uncertainty in global security has intensified and has grown 
beyond the reach of some nascent governments. The challenges have 
mutated and multiplied and the increasing threat of escalation of 
various regional instabilities calls for an even broader 
international cooperation. The post-Cold War cooperation began in 
November 1990, when NATO announced in its London Summit that 
 
in the new Europe, the security of every state is 
inseparably linked to the security of its neighbors. 
NATO must become an institution where Europeans, 
Canadians and Americans work together not only for the 
common defense, but to built new partnerships with all 
the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must 
reach out to the countries of the East which were our 
adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the 
band of friendship. (...) Today we also invite the 
governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of 
Hungary, the Republic of Poland, the Peoples Republic 
of Bulgaria and Romania to come to NATO, not just 
visit, but establish regular diplomatic liaison with 
NATO.15   
 
As a result of the London Summit Declaration, less than one 
year later, the North Atlantic Councils (NAC) statement was 
released saying: 
 
The long decades of European division is over. We 
welcome the major increase in the contacts by the 
Alliance and its members with the Soviet Union and 
other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as they 
accept the hand of friendship extended by the Alliance 
Heads of States and Government in London last year.16 
 
With NATOs Rome Summit Declaration in November 1991, NATO 
and the former Warsaw Pact nations signed a declaration agreeing 
                                                 
15   NATO Summit Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, London, 
5-6 July 1990, §4, 7, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: a Member of NATO, (Budapest, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 157. 
16   Statement Issued by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ministerial 
Session on Partnership With the Countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe,Copenhagen, 6-7 June, 1991, §1, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: a Member of 
NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 157. 
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that they no longer consider each other enemies and that a forum 







                                                
Annual meetings with the North Atlantic Council at 
Ambassadorial level; 
Periodic meetings with the North Atlantic Council at 
Ministerial or Ambassadorial level as circumstances 
warrant; 
Regular meetings, at intervals to be mutually agreed 
with: 
NATO subordinate committees, including the Political 
and Economic Committees; 
The Military Committee and under its direction other 
NATO Military Authorities.17   
 
In December 1991, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) held its first meeting in Brussels. 
 
The role of NACC was to facilitate cooperation on security 
and related issues between the participating countries at 
all levels and to oversee the process of developing closer 
institutional ties as well as informal links between them.18 
 
Confidence building negotiations developed with surprising 
speed, in the next months and the originally proposed activities, 
such as information sharing, observation of exercises and arms 
control, multiplied as well under the auspices of NACC.19 The 
first program for cooperation was a simple plan, which addressed 
some areas of cooperation and offered some substructures to break 
down the main issues. The need for a more structured and concise 
 
17   NATO Summit Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, Relation With the 
Soviet Union and the Other Countries of Central and Eastern Europe: A 
Qualitative Step Forward, Rome, 7-8 November 1991, §11, Joó, Rudolf, 
Hungary: a Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), 
p. 159. 
18   NATO Handbook, (Brussels, NATO Office and Press, 2001), p. 18. 
19   Ibid., p.454. 
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framework for practical military related activities soon became 
apparent to both NATO and its aspirants.      
 
 The idea of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was first 
proposed in October 1993 meeting of the NATO Defense Ministers in 
Travemünde, Germany and endorsed by the heads of states and 
governments at NATOs Brussels Summit in January 1994 with the 
participation of the 16 members of NATO and 27 outsider countries 
of OSCE.  
 
This new program goes beyond dialogue and cooperation 
to forge a real partnership  a Partnership for Peace. 
(...) The Partnership will expand and intensify 
political and military cooperation throughout Europe, 
increase stability and diminish threats to peace, and 
built strengthened relationships by promoting the 
spirit of political cooperation and commitment to 
democratic principles that underpin our Alliance. 
NATO will consult with any active participant in the 
Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat 
to its territorial integrity, political independence, 
or security.20    
 
Responding to the new security challenges NATOs PfP 
initiative was supposed to create an environment of communication 
and cooperation in order to strengthen the relationships between 
East and West. According to the 8 chapters of the PfP Framework 





                                                
Facilitate transparency in national defense planning and 
budgeting processes. 
Ensure and strengthen democratic control of armed forces. 
Develop the capability and readiness to operations under 
the authority of the United Nations and responsibility of 
the CSSE. 
 
20   Partnership For Peace: Invitation, Brussels 10-11 January 1994, Joó, 
Rudolf, Hungary: a Member of NATO(Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
1999), p. 159. 




                                                
Facilitate and deepen military cooperation and 
relationship between NATO and former communist armies 
throughout joint defense planning, training, and 
exercises in order to make them able to undertake peace 
support, peace keeping and humanitarian operations. 
Develop interoperability of forces with the NATO. 
 
Developing and deepening practical cooperation, and 
initiating the most important part of this cooperation, the joint 
defense planning, the Alliance established a biennial, Planning 
and Review Process (PARP) in 1995. The purpose of PARP was to 
identify and evaluate the resources which the partners are able 
to contribute to practical PfP actions, such as  multinational 
PfP training and exercises, as well as NATO-led peace support 
operations.22 
 
USEUCOM and NATO also had to rapidly transform its framework 
and focus on the enhanced democracy and free markets throughout 
Europe in an effort to maintain stability. General George A. 
Joulwan former Commander-in-Chief United States European Command, 
USEUCOM, 1997 vision statement demonstrates this new focus: 
 
A community of free, stable and prosperous nations acting 
together while respecting the dignity and rights of the 
individual and adhering to the principles of national 
sovereignty and international law.23 
 
USEUCOMs  large and diverse Area of Responsibility (AOR) 
has a strategy which directly supports the National Security 
Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS), it is called 
Engagement and Preparedness. The Commander-in-Chiefs (CINC) 
responsibility is to engage nations in the AOR in peacetime to 
 
22   Babos, Tibor, A Békepartnerségi Program fejlődési folyamata, Kard és 
toll, (Budapest, National Defense University, 2000), p. 57. 
23   www.eucom.mil. United States European Command Theater Strategy, 1997, p. 
1.  
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shape the environment, prevent conflict and limit the impact if 
conflict occurs.24 Only by remaining engaged in the region and 
interacting with individuals from all nations will relationships 
be developed that foster stability and peace. The USEUCOM Theatre 
Objectives that directly contribute to the appropriate National 
Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) 




                                                
Maintain, support and contribute to the integrity and 
adaptation of NATO 
Promote stability, democratization, military 
professionalism, and closer relationships with NATO in 
the nations of central Europe and the Newly Independent 
States 
Support the US efforts to ensure a self-sustaining 
progress from the Dayton Process.25 
 
2. The Enhanced Partnership (EP) 
 
By the end of 1995, the Partnership for Peace initiative had 
been uniquely successful in influencing stability and security in 
Europe and fostering improvements in good-neighborly relations. 
It had become a permanent and dynamic feature of European 
security in the mid nineties. A year later the Alliance therefore 
decided to further enhance the role of the Partnership, building 
on its momentum and success that had been achieved thus far. 
 
At the NATO Summit in Sintra, Portugal in May 1997, the 
Alliance decided to enhance and broaden cooperation within the 
framework of Partnership. In Spring 1997 Allied Foreign and 
Defense Ministers launched a wide range of enhancement measures 
which added a new quality to PfP and substantively strengthened 
it in political, security, military and institutional fields. 
 
24   Ibid., p.  3. 
25   Ibid., p. 11. 
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Also, based on the experiences of the Balkan crisis especially in 
Bosnia, NATO proposed to deepen cooperation in order to be able 
to encompass the whole spectrum of peace support operations and 
crisis management activities.26 
 
At the political level, NATO members and the all the Partner 
countries agreed that they would give a new dimension for 
cooperation and instead of the NACC, that was looking to the 
past, they would create a new, more powerful security forum, that 
matched the increasingly sophisticated relationships being 
developed with Partner countries under PfP and in the context of 
the NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. The Euro-Atlantic 
Council (EAPC) was designed to facilitate and manage the Partner 
countries access to selected NATO information, allow them to 
initiate consultations and possibility to take decisions on PfP 
issues jointly with the Alliance. 
 
As the successor of the NACC, EAPC also hoped to provide a 
new force through which various levels of political and defense 
cooperation are intensified. Offering inclusiveness and self 
differentiation, EAPCs main goals are to provide forum for 
political and military cooperation equally to both the Allies and 
Partners on one hand, and to provide a wide scale of activities, 
though which Partners can choose their particular level and areas 
of cooperation with the Alliance on the other. It was also 
envisaged that the EAPC would provide an extended political 
dimension of Partnership by intensifying dialogue and 
consultation mechanisms and based that the military cooperation 
also would be enhanced.27 
 
Building on decisions () one of the important steps 
implemented early on was the establishment of PfP Staff 
Elements (PSEs) in various NATO military headquarters at the 
                                                 
26   Babos, Tibor, A Békepartnerségi Program fejlődési folyamata, Kard és 
toll, (Budapest, National Defense University, 2000), p. 57. 
27   Ibid. 
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strategic and regional levels. A second phase of this 
process, involving the creation of PSEs at the subregional 
level28 
      
Steps were also taken at Madrid to enhance PfP by giving it 
a more operational role. The key aim was to ensure greater 
decision-making opportunities for Partner countries across the 
entire scope of partnership activities, to increase their role in 
planning and to strengthen political consultation and cross-talk. 
Discussions took place between NATO and its Partners about the 
formulation of guidelines, a so-called Political-Military 
Framework (PMF) in order to give the Partners insight and 
influence the NATO-led political and military decision making 
procedure, especially on the fields of crisis management and 
humanitarian operations. Furthermore, in May the new NATO-Russia 
Permanent Joint Council was also created, which was the first 
bilateral forum between the Alliance and Russia. 
  
In the first months, the EAPC covered almost the entire 
spectrum of the challenges of the trans-Atlantic security, from 
general policy matters to joint exercises and NATO-led operations 
taking place in Bosnia. In practical terms, the most successful 
operations were carried out by the Implementation Forces (IFOR) 
and Stabilization Forces (SFOR) and now, the Kosovo Forces 
(KFOR). 
 
The exercise programs were also broadened to include all the 
possible types of challenges other than war that do not involve 
conventional territorial defense. The main focus turned to crisis 
management and peace support operations. The cooperation also 
extended to civil emergency issues, environmental security 
activities, control of nuclear energy, military training, 
education and scientific research matters. 
                                                 




The Partners were also given the opportunity to send more 
liaison officers to Brussels and to various NATO staff units, and 
to delegate personnel to serve as international officers in 
particular PfP units.29 In efforts to broaden the cooperation in 
all of these fields, the partner countries were involved in 
practical decision making processes and experienced the planning 
and implementation procedure of the NATO-led peace support and 
crisis management operations.   
 
The EP also reviewed all of the previously existing PfP 
activities, but especially the PARP and the Individual 
Partnership Program (IPP), which was originally designed to 
promote the national contributions to the PARP, but it lost its 
impetus in the middle of 90s. All of this together increased 
interoperability between the NATO and PfP forces and deepened the 
practical partnership.    
 
In June 1998, NATO Defense Ministerial, Allies and PARP 
countries agreed to write a report entitled Expanding and 
Adapting the PfP Planning and Review Process, which suggested 






3. The Enhanced and More Operational Partnership (EMOP) 
 
The third phase of the metamorphosis of PfP started in 1999 
at the Washington Summit, when the Alliance launched a new 
initiative called Towards a Partnership for the 21tst Century, 
                                                 
29  Ibid. 
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The Enhanced and More Operational Partnership.30 Five years after 
the founding Brussels Summit, PfP grew in size and sophistication 
as well. The overall objectives of PfP enhancement are: to 
strengthen further the political consultation element in PfP; to 
develop a more operational role for Partners and to provide for 
greater involvement of Partners in PfP decision-making and 
planning. A series of enhancements have been developed to meet 
each one of these objectives, aimed not only at building on the 
existing program, but at adding qualitatively to the nature of 
the partnership. The main idea behind EMOP is to deepen the 
functionality of the PfP and shift from the quantitative approach 
to a more qualitative cooperation.31  
 
According to these new concepts, the method of planning 
changed, the old Interoperability Objectives (IOs) were replaced 
by Partnership Goals (PGs) which aimed to develop specific armed 
forces and capabilities that partners could offer in support of 
NATO operations. Above that, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council (EAPC) provided a special forum for more dynamic partner 
input in deliberations involving operations to which they 
contribute forces. 
 
The foundation of the EMOP introduced a new, vibrant and 
ambitious development of numerous initiatives and concepts in PfP 
such as the Political-Military Framework (PMF), Enhanced and 
Adapted Planning and Review Process (PARP), Operational 
Capabilities Concept (OCC), and the Training and Education 
Enhancement Programme (TEEP), which are based on the previous 
areas.32  
                                                 
30   http://www.nato.int/pfp/docu/d990615a.htm (5 May 2003) 
31   Towards a Partnership for the 21st Century, The Enhanced and More  
Operational Partnership, Report by the Political Military Steering 
Committee on Partnership for Peace, § 4-7, 
http://www.nato.int/pfp/docu/d990615a.htm (8 February 2003) 
32   Building Security Through Partnership, online, 
http://www.jcc.nato.int/PfP%20Programme/PfP%20contd.htm (10 January 2003) 
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 a.   The Political-Military Framework (PMF) 
 
 The main purpose of the Political-Military Framework 
(PMF) is to enhance political and military dimensions of the 
Partner Nations in planning and execution of non-Article 5 
operations. PMF provides Partner involvement in political 
consultation and military decision making, as well as in 
operational planning and command arrangements. The PMF basic 
document addresses four phases:  
1. non crisis; 
2. consultation period prior to initiation of military 
planning; 
3. planning and consultation phase, after the initiation of 




 By structuring and institutionalizing practical 
cooperation between the Allies and Partners through each phase of 
an unfolding crisis, the PMF improves the ability to be able to 
create joint and multi-national forces with Partners on crisis 





 b. The Planning and Reviewing Process (PARP) 
 
 
                                                
The PfP Framework Document commits NATO to develop the 
a planning and review process with the Partner countries designed 
 
33   NATO Handbook, (Brussels, NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001),  
p.  74. 
34   NATO Handbook, online, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030210.htm (23 March 2003)  
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to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and 
capabilities which could be made available for multinational 
training, exercises and operations in conjunction with Alliance 
forces. Initially PfP operations were limited to peacekeeping, 
search and rescue and humanitarian operations. However, in 
December 1996, PfP operations and corresponding planning and 
evaluation requirements were expanded to encompass the full range 
of the Alliance's new missions, including peace support 
operations.  
 
 The PARP has become the core element of PfP, with the 
recent modifications brought it closer to the Alliances force 
planning process to the Defense Planning Questioner (DPQ). It is 
designed to provide a structure, which is closely linked with the 
Alliances mechanisms, for identifying and evaluating all of 
those individual military capabilities that are available for 
joint operations.  
 
The Planning and Reviewing Process is offered to 
Partners on an optional basis and draws on NATOs 
extensive experience in defence planning. It is in 
essence biennial process involving both bilateral and 
multilateral elements. For each two-year planning 
cycle, Partners wishing to participate in the process 
undertake to provide information on a wide range of 
subjects including their defence policies, developments 
with regard to the democratic control of the armed 
forces, national policy relating to PfP cooperation, 
and relevant financial and economic plans.35 
 
 The PARP is in essence, a directory of PfPs 
activities, that is offered by the Alliance and allies as well as 
other PfP countries and that is made available for every PfP 
member.36 
 
                                                 
35   NATO Handbook, (Brussels, NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 
pp. 72-73. 
36   NATO Handbook online, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030208.htm 
(2 April 2003) 
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   c. The Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) 
 
 OCC is the main instrument of developing 
interoperability of  military operations and force evaluation, or 
in other words, it is designed to create new dimensions to 
progressively strengthen the operational capabilities between the 
Allies and Partners towards a wider and at the same time deeper 
unity. From the NATOs aspect the OCC is improving the military 
effectiveness of multinational forces, and at the same time the 
practical enhancement of the DPQ as well. Since the NATO-led PfP 
operations are becoming more significant for securing future 
stability, it is crucial for NATO to adapt and improve its 
defenses and crisis management capabilities, and that they are 
adopted by the Partners. Central to the development of the OCC is 
the ability of established, multinational institutions to be self 
supporting and sustainable.37 This is the key issue, and 
optimizing military effectiveness will be most challenging at the 
lower levels of multinational force integration.  
 
Closer and more focused forms of military cooperation 
generated by the OCC improve cooperation in peacetime 
and result in Partner country forces which are more 
effective militarily and better prepared to operate 
with those of the Alliance. This has already helped 
Partner countries to prepare follow-on forces for the 
Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) 
and for the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and will facilitate 
other NATO-led operations that may be undertaken in the 
future.38 
 
 Therefore, the OCC is a profound step in the right 
direction that leads the Alliance and Partnership which will 
prepare basic military tasking of NATO for the upcoming and 
unprecedented security challenges. 
 
                                                 
37   NATO Handbook online, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030211.htm 
(4 April 2003) 
38   Ibid. 
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d. The Training and Education Enhancement Programme 
(TEEP) 
 
 TEEP places an emphasis on improving the effectiveness 
of military and defense related training and is the educational 
aspect of PFP. It aims specifically to deepen cooperation and 
promote interoperability of partner nations and develop forces 
and individuals that are better able to operate within NATO. 
Although training and education still remain in the sphere of 
national responsibility, TEEP offers overall principles governing 
training and provide education mechanisms in order to keep 
training consistent, up to date and transparent for effective 
operational cooperation.39 
 







                                                
linkages and collaboration amongst NATO and PfP training 
and education institutions; 
feedback and assessment related to PfP activities; 
interoperability tools for Partners; 
exercise planning tools and methods to Partners; 
advice by NATO in the field of national training and 
education strategies; 
advanced distributed learning and simulation.40  
    
 All of the new elements introduced in the EMOP are 
clearly considered as positive and promising tools in deepening 
and broadening cooperation. All the aforementioned dimensions of 
the current PfP, but especially the PARP and PMF have proved to 
be beneficial for both the Partners and Allies. By allowing 
Partners to be involved in Peace Support Operations (PSO) and 
 
39   Towards a Partnership for the 21st Century, The Enhanced and More  
Operational Partnership, Report by the Political Military Steering 
Committee on Partnership for Peace, Appendix E, online, 
http://www.nato.int/pfp/docu/d990615f.htm (21 April 2003) 




their related decision making procedures a gradual increase of 
interoperability have been experienced in the NATO-PfP 
operations. The successes of IFOR, SFOR and KFOR are proof of the 
increasing levels of interoperability.     
  
C.  PFP-RELATED NATO INITIATIVES 
 
    Three more NATO initiatives were launched at the Washington 
Summit, which are closely related to the PfP concept but are not 
in the framework of the EMOP. These are the Defense Capabilities 
Initiative (DCI), the South Eastern European Initiative (SEEI) 
and the Membership Action Plan (MAP). The latter was considered 
as one of the most challenging initiative of the Washington 
Summit and which requires an independent subchapter in this 
thesis.  
 
1. Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) 
 
The objective of the Defense Capabilities Initiative is 
to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational 
operations across the full spectrum of Alliance 
missions in the present and foreseeable security 
environment with a special focus on improving 
interoperability among Alliance forces (and where 
applicable also between Alliance and Partner forces).41 
 
The DCI is specifically designed to address those areas 
where the alliance needs to develop its military capabilities, so 
that it can effectively respond to the sorts of challenges it is 
likely to face in the coming years and decades.42 The main focus 
of the DCI is to improve interoperability by increasing mobility 
and deployability of the forces. As far as the nations are 
                                                 
41   Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), December 1999, Overview, NATO Fact 
Sheet, December 2, 1999, online,  
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1999/9912-hq/fs-dci99.htm (12 March 2003) 
42   Sloan Elinor, DCI: Responding to the US-led Revolution in Military 
Affairs, NATO Review, Vol. 48  No. 1, Spring-Summer, 2000, p. 4-7, Web 
Edition http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2000/0001-02.htm (30 March 2003) 
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concerned, the implementation of the DCI falls under the defense 
planning system. The main objectives of developing DCI today are:   
• Deployability enhanced by investing in air and sea lift and 
by reorganizing forces into smaller, more rapidly mobile 
units that are equipped with lighter, yet precision weapons.  
• Sustainability, which is dependent on applying advanced 
technologies to logistics efforts.  
• Effective engagement, which requires a wide variety of 
advanced weapons. It also necessitates that these systems be 
interoperable among services and militaries to facilitate 
the joint and combined operations.  
• Survivability involves efforts to protect forces against the 
possible use of weapons of mass destruction.  
• Improved C3I, by advanced interoperability that are 
essential for enhancing military capability.43 
2. South East Europe Initiative (SEEI) 
 
The other PfP related NATO initiative launched at the 
Washington Summit was the South East Europe Initiative (SEEI). 
 
The initiative was designed to build on NATO's already 
extensive contribution to security and stability in the 
region and take it to a new level, with a particular 
regional focus involving Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Croatia and including, when circumstances would permit, 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.44 
 
PfP experience in promoting stability through conflict 
prevention and crisis management has been put to use in the 
development of NATOs South East Europe Initiative (SEEI). By 
applying its practical approach to the development of regional 
cooperation in South East Europe, PfP is making a substantial 
                                                 
43   Ibid. 
44   NATO Handbook online, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0306.htm 
(11 April 2003) 
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contribution to SEEI. Regional actors take the lead role in a 
great variety of activities, which are modeled after PfP but 
further enhanced by a region-wide, rather than country-specific, 
focus. NATO complements these efforts by activities that it 
conducts itself. The customized application of PfP tools to South 
East Europe is helping to create a model for regional security 
cooperation, which has relevance and utility beyond the Balkan 
region as well.45 
 
While the previous initiatives have there merit, the third 
and  from this thesis perspective - the most challenging 
initiative of the Washington Summit, is the Membership Action 
Plan (MAP) initiative. This innovative program has proven to be 
successful in preparing NATO aspirants for membership and a 
review is warranted. 
 
D.  NATO INTEGRATION AND THE PARTNERSHIP, THE MAP INITIATIVE 
 
1. The Pre-MAP Period 
 
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any 
other European State in a position to further the 
principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the 
security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this 
Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the 
Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with 
the Government of the United States of America. The 
Government of the United States of America will inform 
each of the Parties of the deposit of each such 
instrument of accession.46 
 
 
The history of the Alliance proved that the North Atlantic 
Community is not a exclusive and closed entity. The Alliance has 
demonstrated five times so far that it is open for admitting new 
                                                 
45   NATO Handbook online, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030213.htm 
(3 January 2003) 
46   The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949, § 10. 
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members: Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal Republic of 
Germany in 1995, Spain in 1982, reunification of Germany in 
1991, and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined the 
Alliance, with which process the number of the members are 19 
today.  
 
As far as the recent enlargement is concerned, opening a 
new face in the history of the Alliance, the process began with 
the end of the Cold War. Some years later, in 1994, the 16 
Allied leaders reconfirmed that, as provided in the Article 10 
of the Washington Treaty, was open to membership of other 
European states in a position to further the principles of the 
Washington Treaty and to contribute to security in the North 
Atlantic region. 
 
The Alliance adopted a Study on NATO Enlargement in 1995, 
which was aimed to describe all of the relevant factors to be 
taken into account in the enlargement process. It also 
stipulated that the process should take into account political- 
and security-related developments throughout Europe.47  
 
Based on the studys findings, the Alliance conducted a 
and intensified dialogue on membership questions with 
interested Partners. This intensified dialogue provided 
Allies with valuable information on individual 
Partners preparations for membership, and allowed 
participating countries aspiring to NATO 
 
membership to learn more about the workings of the 
Alliance and the responsibilities and obligations 
involved.48 
  
At the summit in Madrid, in July 1997, NATO invited Partner 
Countries to appoint ambassadors to Brussels and invitations were 
                                                 
47   NATO Handbook, online, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030102.htm (11 May 2003) 
48   Klaiber, Klaus-peter, The Membership Action Plan: Keeping NATOs Door 
Open, NATO Review, Web edition, Vol. 47  No. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 23-25., 
on line, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9902-05.htm (3 March 2003) 
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issued to three partner countries to join the Alliance, thus 
beginning the 4th wave of NATO integration. 
 
Today, we invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
to begin accession talks with NATO. Our goal is to sign 
the Protocol of Accession at the time of the 
Ministerial Meetings in December 1997 and to see the 
ratification process completed in time for membership 
to become effective by the 50th anniversary of the 
Washington Treaty in April 1999.49 
     
With the invitation of the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland, and their dynamic contribution the Enhanced Partnership 
Concept was ready to transform, to obtain extend dimensions of 
cooperation. The § 6 of the Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic 
Security and Cooperation on 8 July 1997, made clear to the 
Central and Eastern European states that NATO remains open to 
new members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The 
clear intention to enlarge the Alliance in the foreseeable future 
gives an enormous energy and impetous to the integration process. 
 
In the fall of 1997, accession talks were held with each of 
the three invited countries, and on 16 December 1997, NATO 
Foreign Ministers signed Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty 
on the accession. During 1998, Allied countries ratified the 
Protocols of Accession according to their national procedures.50 
 
After completion of their own national legislative 
procedures, the Foreign Ministers of the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland deposited instruments of accession to the North 
Atlantic Treaty in a ceremony in Independence, Missouri, in the 
                                                 
49   Meeting of the NAC, Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and 
Cooperation issued by the Heads of State and Government, Madrid, 8 July 
1997, § 6, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: a Member of NATO(Budapest, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 169. 
50   NATO Handbook, online, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030102.htm (2 January 2003) 
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United States. The formal accession of the three new members took 
place on 12 March 1999.51 
 
The integration of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
into NATO, has ultimately redefined the European security 
landscape. Simultaneously, this occasion encouraged other 
Central and Eastern European countries, which were interested in 
joining the Alliance, to follow that example. However, at the 
same time, based on the experiences of the last integration 
process, Brussels also worked out a more structuralized 
framework for possible future integration. 
 
NATOs three new members will not be the last. NATOs 
door remains open and the Membership Action Plan is 
clear evidence of the Alliances commitment to 
continuing the enlargement process.52   
 
2. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) 
 
The Membership Action Plan (MAP) was launched in the 
Washington Summit, to assist those countries which wish to join 
the Alliance in their preparations by providing advice, 
assistance and practical support on all aspects of NATO 
membership.53 The MAP was designed to identify the expectations 
of NATO membership and structuralize the further NATO accession. 
The MAP gives substance to NATOs commitment to keep 
its door open. However, participation in the MAP does 
not guarantee future membership, nor does the Plan 
consist simply of a checklist for aspiring countries to 
fulfill. Decisions to invite aspirants to start 
                                                 
51   Ibid. 
52   Klaiber, Klaus-peter, The Membership Action Plan: Keeping NATOs Door 
Open, NATO Review, Web edition, Vol. 47  No. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 23-25., 
on line, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9902-05.htm (3 March 2003) 
53   NATO Handbook, online, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030103.htm (4 May 2003)  
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accession talks will be taken within NATO by consensus 
and on a case-by-case basis.54 
The Membership Action Plan (MAP) process underlines 
NATO's commitment to its Open Door policy by assisting 
(...) aspiring countries in their own efforts to 
prepare for possible future membership. The 
streamlining of this process, which we have undertaken 
in consultation with aspirants, has improved its 
efficiency and effectiveness.55 
 
For the Aspirant countries, the launch of the 
Membership Action Plan, a new and important initiative 
in NATO enlargement process, was certainly one of the 
most important results of the Washington Summit.56    
 
The programme offers aspirants a list of activities 
from which they may select those they consider of most 
value to help them in their preparations. Active 
participation in PfP and EAPC mechanisms remains 
essential for aspiring countries who wish to further 
deepen their political and military involvement in the 
work of the Alliance.57 
 
However it does not provide a checklist for aspiring 
countries to fulfill, nor would their participation in the 
program prejudice any decision by the NATO on issuing an 
invitation to begin accession talks.58  
 
The MAP is divided into five main areas, which are also 
divided into other issues that might encompass the preparation of 
the individual Annual National Plans (ANP): 
1. Political and economic; 
2. Defense and military; 
3. Resource management; 
                                                 
54   NATO Handbook, online, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030103.htm (2 January 2003) 
55   Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held in Budapest, § 51, 
29-30 May, 2001, Budapest, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-077e.htm 
(7 May 2003)  
56   Luik, Jüri, Membership Action Plan (MAP)  On the Road Toward NATO, 
Baltic Defense Review, 2/1999, p. 27. 
57   Membership Action Plan, § 2, 
58   Klaiber, Klaus-peter, The Membership Action Plan: Keeping NATOs Door 
Open, NATO Review, Web edition, Vol. 47  No. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 23-25., 
on line, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9902-05.htm (9 April 2003) 
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4. Security, and 
5. Legal issues 
 
Each candidate country is requested to prepare an Annual 
National Plan on the efforts that they have done so far and that 
they are going to do for the possible future membership. In 
detail they set objectives and targets for its preparations and 
contain specific information on steps being taken, the 
responsible authorities and, where appropriate, a schedule of 
work on specific aspects of those preparation. The ANP, prepared 
each year by each aspirants forms a basis for the Alliance to 
keep track of aspirants progress and to provide appropriate and 
nation-specific feedback.59 
 
Feedback and advice to aspirants on MAP/ANP issues is 
provided through mechanisms based on those currently in use in 
the Alliance60. 19+1 meetings are held with each MAP-country at 
the various levels of NATO administration: NATO Team Workshops, 
Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC), Senior Political 
Committee (Reinforced) (SPC[R]), and the North Atlantic Council. 
Also the Military Committee, the Division of Political Affairs 
(PA) and the Assistant Secretary General (ASG) are involved in 
the preparation of the ANPs.  
 
Each year the Alliance will draw up for individual 
aspirants a report providing feedback focused on 
progress made in the areas covered in their annual 
national programmes. This document would form the basis 
of discussion at a meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council with the aspirant country. The report would 
help identify areas for further action, but it would 
remain at the aspirants discretion to commit itself to 
taking further action.61 
 
Currently there are ten NATO aspirants that are 
participating in the MAP: are Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
                                                 
59   Membership Action Plan, § 5, 
60   Ibid., § 7. 
61   Ibid., § 9. 
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Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
 
The Alliance will continue to welcome new members in a 
position to further principles of the Treaty and 
contribute to security in Euro-Atlantic area. The 
Alliance expect to extend further invitations in coming 
years to nations willing and able to assume the 
responsibilities and obligations of memberships, and as 
NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations 
would serve the overall political and strategic 
interests of the Alliance and that the inclusion would 
enhance overall European security and stability.62  
 
MAP does not replace the Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
programme. In fact, participation in PfP for aspiring countries 
remains essential, as it provides a well-established way of 
developing progressive interoperability with the Alliance forces. 
(...) Like PfP, the MAP is guided by the principle of self-
differentiation. Aspirants are free to match their participation 
with their own national priorities and circumstances and to 
decide upon their own implementation measures and timetable. 
 
No doubt that the enlargement of the Alliance, whatever its 
scope, had and will have a crucial impact on the shape of PfP, as 
its geometrical balance and the Euro-Atlantic order will 
subsequently change as well.  
E.  INTERPRETING PfP TODAY 
 
The Partnership for Peace is the principal mechanism 
for forging practical security links between the 
Alliance and its Partners. Though detailed programs 
that reflect individual Partners capacities and 
interests, Allies and Partners work together towards 
transparency in national defense planning and 
budgeting; democratic control of defense forces; 
preparedness for civil disasters and other emergencies; 
                                                 
62   Meeting of the NAC, Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and 
Cooperation issued by the Heads of State and Government, Madrid, 8 July 
1997, § 6, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: a Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 169. 
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and development of the ability to work together, 
including in NATO-led PfP operations.63  
  
PfP and its future development faces many positive 
challenges for the whole Euro-Atlantic region. Though PfP has 
been evolving since its foundation, the basic principles and 
concept remain the same. But in the past nine years, the security 
environment and strategic challenges have shifted with 
unprecedented events and PfP must respond accordingly. 
 
PfP has proven to be an enormously successful program, 
surpassing many of the original, idealistic expectations of what 
the program could accomplish. Nine years after its inception, PfP 
has developed in both its size and quality. Personnel from the 
nineteen members of the Alliance and twenty-six partner 
countries, forty-five nations all together have been working 
together at all levels on a wide range of political and military 
disciplines. 
 
In retrospect, when NATO adopted Partnership for Peace at 
the Brussels Summit in January 1994, nobody could predict how 
important and essential it would actually become and many, at 
that time, aspiring NATO members were disappointed, perceiving 
PfP as a policy of postponement. From the recent perspective it 
is clear, that launching of the PfP was a breakthrough moment in 
the cooperation between East and West and the future of the 
transatlantic security and facilitated a new dimension for the 
stability in that region.64 Presently, PfP and EAPC provides the 
broadest cooperation in Europe since the Vienna Congress. 
 
                                                 
63   Report by the Political Military Steering Committee on PfP, Towards a 
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Partnership, June 15 1999, § 5., 
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64   Babos, Tibor, A Békepartnerségi Program fejlődési folyamata, Kard és 
toll, (Budapest, National Defense University, 2000), p. 59. 
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PfP is the strongest permanent feature of the Euro-Atlantic 
and Euro-Asiatic security architecture. The biennial the 
Partnership Work Program (PWP) offers more than 2,000 security, 
defense and military related activities to all the 45 
participants. Ranging from military exercises, to special 
conferences and seminars to individual visits, PWP touches 
virtually every area of NATOs activities. In accordance with 
their financial capabilities and means, and based on the 
principle of self-differentiation, nations offer their 
individual contribution by the Individual Partnership Program 
(IPP) and can choose activities from the overall PWP, that 
support their national security and defense policies. 
 
All the initiatives of the EMOP have proven to be beneficial 
for the Partners involved in NATO-related decision making 
activities and have been able to increase their level of 
interoperability. In addition to the practical dimension of 
cooperation achieved in the exercises, the Partnership has been 
developing a wider and deeper standardization in planning and 
doctrine making.65 
 
The PfP community has had a significant effect to the 
transformation of the Alliance. Though all of the PfP activities 
are related to Partner Countries, the roles and missions are 
changing in support of the revised Strategic Concept of the 
Alliance. 
Yet, PfP membership does not guarantee the extension of 
NATOs collective defense umbrella to partner countries. But 
according to the § 8 of the PfP Framework Document “NATO will 
consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that 
Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, 
political independence, or security.”  
                                                 
65   Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held in Budapest, § 56, 
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According to the principles of the PfP, Partners can 
cooperate and get involved at various levels of cooperation, 
according to their national security interests and capability, by 
using the individually tailored programs. The variable level of 
concentration of the PfP Program gives opportunity to all of the 
members to carry out its national goals. Some of those countries, 
which are intend to join the Alliance, PfP means to achieve the 
necessary level of interoperability with the Alliance. For those 
countries however, which do not want to become full NATO members, 
PfP is an association or a forum, where they can contribute to 
the collective Euro-Atlantic security and cooperate 
constructively in the areas of mutual interests.66  
 
In conclusion, PfP today is a security initiative rather 
than an institution, though it has some features, which make it 
more than a simple initiative. It has decision making and 
executive bodies, and has a staff which is responsible for its 
operation. The PfP is also a network and an organization in which 
the members are free to act, propose their initiatives and  most 
importantly  Partners can select areas of cooperation that will 
give them access to NATOs practice, and wide range of regional 
and bilateral cooperation. 
 
Most importantly, the PfP has been strengthening and forging 
a security environment of mutual confidence, respect and 
partnership in a previously antagonistic region. Still, to 
strengthening the EAPC and PfP to enhance cooperation, 
transparency and confidence among all the members of the Euro-
Atlantic community. Partnership is pivotal to the role of the 
Alliance in promoting security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic 
                                                 
66   Babos, Tibor, A Békepartnerségi Program fejlődési folyamata, Kard és 
toll, (Budapest, National Defense University, 2000), p. 60. 
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region and contributes to the enhancement of the Alliance's 
capabilities in crisis management.67  
   
The PfP has proven to be a fruitful and successful 
experience for the nations of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. 
Hungary was able to make significant strides toward NATO 
membership and further security integration via this program and 
its initiatives. 
                                                 
67   Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held in Budapest, § 54, 
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III. HUNGARY AND THE PFP 
 
 
For centuries, Hungary has been at the 
center of European history, politics and 
 culture. The Cold War, however, artificially 
 divided Europe, and cut Hungary off from 




A.  METAMORPHOSIS THE HUNGARIAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 
The systemic change in the world order represented a choice 
for new values, which also determined the main direction of 
Hungarian foreign policy. Euro-Atlantic integration received a 
special emphasis and Hungarys joining NATO and the European 
Union was confirmed as the priority objective of foreign policy 
of both governments which entered into office after the 1990 and 
1994 elections.  
 
NATO membership has been the quintessential foreign 
policy goal of Hungarian governments since 1990. Seven 
years after Gyula Horn, then foreign minister of the 
last communist government (later Prime Minister, 1994-
98), publicly speculated about the possibility of his 
countrys future membership in the alliance.69 
 
The goal of improving Hungarys relations with their 
neighboring countries, ending historic tensions of the previous 
centuries and achieving reconciliation, fostering mutual 
confidence and a rapid broadening of relations has been closely 
related to this endeavor. Hungary also attaches key importance to 
avoiding any ethnic conflict that may threaten the stability of a 
traditionally multi-ethnic Central Europe. Therefore, Hungary is 
committed to providing the national minorities living in Hungary 
with legal guarantees and practical opportunities for the 
                                                 
68   Javier Solana, Foreword, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: a Member of NATO, 
(Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 9. 
69   Zolton Barany, Americas New Allies: Poland Hungary and the Czech 
Republic in NATO,  Andrew Michta editor. (London: University of 
Washington Press, 1999)  p. 74. 
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preservation of their national, linguistic and cultural identity. 
For the very same reason, Hungary expects the neighboring 
countries where Hungarian minorities live to reciprocate. 
 
The fundamentally new international political and security 
environment after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact gave a 
unique opportunity for Hungary to analyze, independently, its 
national foreign and security policy options. A new national, 
foreign policy was developed in Hungary in 1990 by the first 
post-communist government. It was declared that both national 
foreign and security policy have to promote the country's re-
entering the Western community of values and political practice. 
A three-pillar foreign policy was developed for the country 
which: the Euro-Atlantic integration and regional stability 
include integration into NATO and the EU; as well as co-
operation: developing and extending regional co-operation and 
establishing solid good-neighborly relations with all neighboring 
countries; while pursuing coordinated policies with the 
organizations of ethnic Hungarians in other countries for the 
preservation and support of their identity.70 
 
The deepening of the Euro-Atlantic integration of 
Hungary is a priority objective of Hungarian foreign 
policy in order for our country to become a full-
fledged and esteemed member of the community of nations 
with democratic market economies. After the achievement 
of NATO membership on the 12th of March 1999, we are 
now preparing to join the European Union in 2004.71 
 
Euro-Atlantic integration is a fundamental expression of 
Hungary's determining political affinity as well as an ultimate 
anchor of its developing democracy and market economy. At the 
same time, it is also the Euro-Atlantic framework that is capable 
                                                 
70   János Martonyis, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Annual Report of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Committee of the Foreign Affairs of 
the Hungarian Parliament, Budapest, February 7, 2001, online, 
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71   Foreign Policy, Government Portal, online, 
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of providing a fundamental democratic solution to the situation 
of ethnic minorities in Central Europe. This has, for a long 
time, been one of the main intra-regional sources of discord.72 
(Appendix II. Hungarys Integration) 
 
As far as our goals related to integration are 
concerned, we consider all significant European and 
Euro-Atlantic institutions as different elements of one 
and the same structure, as elements, which can mutually 
complement and reinforce each other. From this follows 
our endeavor that has been pursued consistently ever 
since the change of system, namely to obtain membership 
in all of these international organizations upon 
complying with the necessary conditions.73 
 
Regional stability on the other hand is indispensable for 
securing peace, development and further democratization in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
In the framework of regional co-operation Hungary 
strives to maintain manifold, neighbourly relations 
with its neighbouring countries and the countries of 
the region. Hungary is an active participant in the 
rejuvenated Visegrád collaboration and in the work of 
Central European organisations. While in South Eastern 
Europe we have taken a substantive role in the 
permanent resolution of the crises recurring over the 
past decade and in the promotion of the recovery of the 
region.74 
 
In the current international and national political context, 
the foreign and security policy of Hungary is based on the twin 
principles of co-operation and integration. These twin principles 
constitute a parallel track of Hungary's developing international 
relations, and they have to remain parallel in the future as 
well. Neither can, however, they replace the other. Integration 
into Western security, political and economic structures limit 
the scope of relations to a certain number of countries for 
                                                 
72   http://hungaryemb.ines.ro/hu/prioritasai.htm (3 March 2003)  
73   Martonyi János, Német Zsolt, Hungarian Foreign Policy and Euro-Atlantic 
Integration, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: A Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry 
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Hungary. Co-operation on the other hand has to proceed with a 
much wider range of countries, also including those with which 
integration is not, or is not yet, possible.75 
 
It pays particular attention, however, to make sure 
that there is a balance among these goals. It keeps in 
mind that none of these goals must subordinated to 
another of to be asserted to the detriment of another. 
The successful fulfillment of these endeavors makes 
them interdependent on one another and closely links 
them together.76 
 
The translation of the foreign policy priorities into 
security policy on the basis of Hungary's national interests can 
be expressed in two major policy goals, Euro-Atlantic 
integration, international cooperation, and regional stability, 
on the one hand, and national strength, on the other. The 
ultimate goal is to develop policies whereby all national values 
and interests shall mutually support and strengthen one another.  
 
Since 1990, defense official have been quick to point 
out that Hungary has no specific enemy and is under no 
direct threat. Still, there are a number of potential 
challenges they must take seriously, particularly 
because of Hungarys unfavorable geostrategic 
position.77  
 
Certain security threats did not disappear altogether as it 
was expected for a short while in 1989/90. Due to Hungary's 
geopolitical situation, the country needs to take in account all 
types of the new threats in establishing its priorities for 
policy objectives. The common characteristic of the threats is 
the insufficiency of national ways and means to fight them. These 
emerging threats and realistic, pragmatic responses to them 
                                                 
75   Government Programme, The Government of Republic of Hungary, 
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76   Martonyi János, Német Zsolt, Hungarian Foreign Policy and Euro-Atlantic 
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underpin the arguments for adopting the national security policy 
of co-operation and integration by Hungary. 
 
Hungary's relatively small size is no excuse for inactivity 
in attaining the country's national interests. New priorities 
however can only be determined and effectively pursued on the 
basis of genuine democratic political beliefs. At the given 
historic junction, Hungary cannot be, or seem, passive or merely 
re-active. 
 
Hungarian foreign and security policy should continue to 
create new forms of co-operation while at the same time deepen 
the already existing frameworks. The combination of unilateral 
and international action should continue to remain characteristic 
of Hungarian Security Policy and infrastructure in order to 
promote the national interest and to achieve the strategic goals 
of integration and stability.78  
 
It is with this in mind that the Partnership for Peace 
Programme and the U.S. State Partnership Program (SPP) have taken 
a special role and have become essential to Hungarys future. 
 
B.  HUNGARY’S INTEGRATION AND PARTICIPATION IN PfP 
 
We have come a long way in a rather short of 
 period of time with historical standards.79 
 
Victor Orbán, 
Prime Minister of Hungary 
(1998-2002) 
Hungary was a member of the political and military 
structure of the Warsaw Pact and of COMECOM. Soviet 
troops were stationed on the territory of Hungary. The 
number of troops in the Hungarian Peoples Army was 
                                                 
78   Government Programme, The Government of Republic of Hungary, 
http://www.kormany.hu/program/index.en.html (9 April 2003) 
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around 160,000 during peacetime. The magnitude of 
Hungarian military expenditure was higher than 3.5 
percent of GDP (...). Hungary was ruled by a one-party 
system and an economy based on centralized planning. 
The country bordered five neighbors, three of which 
were members of the Warsaw Pact.80  
 
But all of this has changed and today Hungary is a full-
fledged NATO member and potential EU candidate. 
 
In less than in a year from Spring of 1989, Hungarys 
political, economic and social structures changed profoundly. 
After four decades, of a one-party system and a command economy, 
predominantly based on state ownership, Hungary instituted a 
multiparty democracy and market economy based on private 
ownership. This transformation was supported by the overwhelming 
majority of the population. As a result of the free and 
democratic elections held in the spring of 1990, only those 
political parties won seats in the Hungarian National Assembly 
whose program were based on the rule of law and free enterprise. 
 
It is desirable for us to agree with all member states 
that Hungary should not be a member of the Warsaw 
Treaty. As a first step, the Government should set 
itself the goal during the negotiations to suspend 
Hungarys participation in the military organization of 
the Warsaw Treaty.81  
 
The new, democratically elected Hungarian Governments first 
and most important political endeavor was the Euro-Atlantic 
integration. Hungary has declared that integration into the 
western democratic institutions is a priority for the country. 
The first security related institution Hungary joined was the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991.  
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Hungary: A Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), 
p. 28. 
81   Resolution No. 54/1990/VII.3./ of the Hungarian National Assembly on the 
Relationship Between the Republic of Hungary and the Warsaw Treaty, Joó, 
Rudolf, Hungary: A Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 1999), p. 129. 
 40
The basic principles of security policy approved by the 
National Assembly on 12 March, 1993 demonstrate that 
one of the main endeavors of the Hungarian security 
policy is the rapprochement and subsequent membership 
in the institutions of Western European integration. 
The basic principles of national defense adopted on 14 
April, 1993 in accordance with the basic principles of 
security policy, on the other hand, confirm that the 
guarantees of the countrys security can in long run 
only be ensured through the institutional framework of 
multi-faceted cooperation.82 
 
A year later the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations 
Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) was launched, and Hungary 
joined in the first wave on 8 February 1994, making it the fifth 
state to join.83 Participation in the PfP played a determinant 
role of Hungarys future integration. 
 
In September 1995 NATO produced a study on NATO Enlargement 
that outlined the Alliances expectations of new members.84 The 
study noted that PfP would assist Partners to undertake necessary 
defense management reforms such as transparent national defense 
planning, resource allocation and budgeting, appropriate 
legislation and parliamentary and public accountability. The PfP 
Planning and Review Process (PARP) and PfP exercises introduced 
Partners to NATOs collective defense planning, the Defense 
Planning Questioner (DPQ), and paved the way for more operational 
planning. 
 
Following the procedures outlined in the Study of NATO 
Enlargement, Hungary started a series of meetings with the 
Alliance in the framework of Individual Dialogue. That process 
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allowed Hungary to intensify its cooperation with the Alliance 
and to present the main issues linked with the integration in 
detail. That higher level of bilateral dialogue enabled to the 
country to become more familiar with and have a better 
understanding of NATOs expectations for the aspirants.  
 
As first of the former Warsaw Pact member states, Hungary 
officially declared its intention to join NATO on 29 January, 
1996. The next milestone of Hungarys Western integration was 
NATOs Madrid Summit, in 1997, when, along with three other 
countries, Hungary was invited to join by the Alliance. One year 
later Hungary was also invited by the EU to begin official 
bilateral negotiations on integration into the EU.  
 
In 1999 Hungary joined the Alliance, and participated in the 
Washington Summit as a full NATO member. In the same year Hungary 
also became an associated member of the Western European Union 
(WEU). 
 
Hungary started a special PR campaign at the same time to 
achieve wide support of its public for membership and clarify all 
misunderstandings and overcome objections regarding the 
accession, and clarify and communicate the costs of the 
integration to the public. 
 
The referendum took place on 16 November, 1997, with a 
participation of 49.24 percent of all Hungarian 
citizens entitled to vote. 85 percent of the turnout 
voted in favor of Hungarys accession to the North 
Atlantic alliance and 14.67 percent against.85  
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March 12th 1999 was a historic day: Hungary became a 
full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
Through this act Hungary officially and irrevocably 
became part of the Euro-Atlantic community of values as 
well as a part of the political and security system of 
alliance pursuing common interests and objectives.86 
 
Hungarys accession has a fundamental and long-term 
beneficial effect on the security and future of the country. The 
foreign and economic policies of Hungary now has greater 
potential and interest representation capabilities, however at 
the same time Hungarys responsibility has also increased in 
issues concerning the security of the entire Euro-Atlantic 
area.87 
 
In political terms, Hungary's integration into NATO is 
completed. Military integration is ongoing; the 
consistent implementation of military reform is an 
important element in this process. The establishment of 
a state-of-the-art, effective, sustainable Hungarian 
military force that is able to meet new challenges is 
essential for NATO tasks and for the defence of the 
country alike.88  
 
Hungarian participation in the PfP entered another dimension 
its entry into NATO: Hungarys participation became increasingly 
a donor country, rather than just a consumer. 
 
This is in line with our endeavor to participate, a one 
of few NATO-members of the region, in preparing 
countries aspiring for membership and more generally, 
in strengthening the links between NATO and the partner 
countries. In the course of our participation we will 
pay special attention to the Southern and Southeastern 
periphery of Europe, which is overburden with 
challenges and for the security of we feel a special 
kind of responsibility.89  
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NATOs enlargement, which is taking place according to the 
principle of inclusion of some nations and not at the exclusion 
of others, may prove extremely valuable in the future as it can 
serve the prevention of future conflicts between neighboring 
countries and guarantee the maintenance of stability in the 
interior of these states.  
 
In line with that, the Hungarian strategy for cooperation 
with the Alliance through the PfP was oriented from the beginning 
towards prospective membership.  
Hungary's PFP effort will seek:  
• To develop a training and educational program with NATO 
and NATO members.  
• To cooperate closely in peacekeeping monitoring and 
operations. They have already begun cooperation with 
Nordic countries in PKO and monitoring activities. (The 
Hungarian Armed Forces are not capable of meeting large 
requests.)  
• To establish in Budapest a regional peacekeeping center 
for education and training for this center, they will 
seek NATO's help.  
• To begin joint exercises. (Germany and the UK will carry 
out a joint exercise with Hungarian forces in Hungary; 
the Dutch have requested that Hungarian forces 
participate in an exercise on Dutch soil.)  
• To bolster their staff in Belgium.90  
In the following years the cooperation focused on five 
priority areas: 
• Defense planning 
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• Command and communications systems 
• Standardization 
• Defense infrastructure 
• Military education and training 
 
Since 1994, Hungary has participated in a number of 
exercises and projects organized within the PfP and in the PfP 
spirit. Hungary also took part in two cycles of the Planning and 
Review Process. All the undertakings were pursued as priority 
projects. The Hungarian government was fully aware that this new 
cooperation would enable the Hungarian Armed Forces, in a short 
amount of time, to achieve minimum interoperability and mutual 
trust.  
The past few years have proved over and over again that 
is needed an epochal initiative. PfP has mediated a new 
security and defense philosophy to the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Practical experience and 
skills accumulated in the course of PfP co-operation 
have played a crucial role in enabling to succeed in 
fulfilling the expectations vis-á-vis NATO membership 
and in achieving the minimum level of interoperability 
and compatibility required for membership in the 
Alliance.(...) PfP has created an extremely important 
practical framework for confidence building and 
development of relations between the Hungarian Defense 
Forces and the armed forces of NATO member states, as 





C.  FULFILLMENT OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS 
 
If we can train to common standards, 
procedures and doctrine and at some 
point put them under a Combined  
Joint Task Force, we have created 
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 45
a new NATO and a new Europe92 
 
GEN George Joulwan  
 
As President Göncz noted, Hungarys need for NATO 
membership was motivated by values shared with the 
West, by the desire to belong to a favorable security 
environment, and by the potential membership offered 
for creating a more cost-effective defense 
establishment.93  
 
The benefits of membership in NATO may only emerge if 
members are willing to make significant contributions to the 
collective security. The experience of Hungary, Poland and the 
Czech Republic (the V3 entrants) since 1999 offers some idea of 
what can be expected.  One of the basic requirements of 
enlargement was and is the fulfillment of certain Minimum 
Military Requirements (MMR) by the Invited Countries.94 To help 
satisfy these requirements, and speed up this process for early 
membership, NATO-experts have visited Hungary several times right 
before the accession. These meetings were not simply a means to 
control and monitor compliance but, rather, a clear indication 
that NATO wanted a successful integration of Hungary. 
 
Post-Communist Hungary inherited a military establishment 
that had been prepared and outfitted as part of the Warsaw Pacts 
doctrine of coalition warfare. 
  
As such, it was fraught with an oversized command 
structure, strategic imbalances, antiquated armaments, 
organizational asymmetries, and apathetic professional 
personnel.  The number of combat, logistical and 
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training units were excessive, and there was virtually 
no indigenous air defense capability.95 
 
Altogether, five areas of Minimum Military Requirements 
(MMRs) were identified,  
1-2. Security and CIS; 
3. Air Defense; 
4. Infrastructure, and  
5. Force Contributions. 
6 Miscellaneous Issues  covered various manpower-
related questions. 
 
Security and CIS: On the basis of a legislative package 
approved by the Hungarian Parliament in December 1998, the 
National Security Authority and the National Communications 
Security Authority were established. At the Defense Staff, a 
National Distribution Authority was established to handle crypto 
issues. Hungary guaranteed that the crypto personnel, couriers 
and registrars, the soldiers expected to fill NATO positions and 
those soldiers and civilians who handle NATO documents be cleared 
to the sufficient level.  
 
The most important information security regulations and 
equipment has been available since the time of the accession. At 
registries receiving NATO documents and data, Hungary has 
guaranteed compliance with NATO security regulations. The 
requisite personnel was briefed on the new regulations. NATO 
delivered the promised information security equipment (among 
them, the CHRONOS system), they have been installed and duly 
tested. 
 
In the field of Air Defense, Hungarys most important task 
was to make the Air Sovereignty Operations Center operational. To 
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ensure non-stop operation of the center, Hungary has trained 
enough personnel to man 24 operational shifts. The project 
bolstered the confidence of the Hungarian defense industry, since 
they help to create the operating software.  
 
While Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) equipment for the NATO-
assigned forces was delayed, Alliance experts thought that the 
Hungarian Air Defense satisfied MMRs. Training and sorties by 
aircrews was in accordance with Hungarian goals, yet flight 
hours, for the time being, under the NATO average. There are many 
aviators who fly no more than 30 hours per year, which in 
insufficient to maintain already required skills, much less to 
develop them.96 Nevertheless, readiness checks and exercises 
help maintain preparedness. 
 
Infrastructural requirements included those related to (1) 
Host Nation Support (HNS), (2) the training and preparation of 
logistics liaison teams, and (3) the availability of air 
navigation aids and radios were satisfactorily fulfilled by the 
January 1999. 
 
In terms of force contributions, Hungary reported on the 
status and availability of forces assigned to NATO from the very 
start. Although not all the requirements have been fully met, 
SHAPE experts considered fulfillment satisfactory to support 
early membership. As experience has proved however, 
satisfactory did not mean optimal. The shortfall in equipment 
and/or capabilities of the HDF could become impediments for joint 
action in the future.  
 
Finally there is the “miscellaneous” category. Hungary was 
responsible for two issues, (1) the selection and logistic 
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support of personnel to fill NATO positions, and (2) English 
language skills of the personnel designated to contact the 
Alliance. Personnel were selected to fill NATO positions and 
logistic support for them is secured through multilateral and 
bilateral arrangements. 
 
English language skills of the personnel, while not 
exemplary, are satisfactory to ensure communications between 
Hungary and NATO. Since in the past, Hungarian teaching and 
examination methods were not synchronized with NATO STANAG 6001 
linguistic requirements, Hungary still has to speed up testing to 
provide a better picture of overall linguistic capabilities. 
 
These and other measures have been taken to establish 
initial capabilities for membership. In the long term, Hungary 
shall have to satisfy more demanding requirements and details. 
Yet, by satisfying the MMRs, Hungary has made a step in the right 
direction, a step that has perhaps, shown in the commitment to 
the Alliance.97 No doubt, in the future, Hungary shall have to 
rely on such help time and time again. 
 
D.  STUMBLING BLOCKS OF HUNGARY’S NATO INTEGRATION, LESSONS 
LEARNED 
 
The process of Accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary to the Washington Treaty was the culmination of one of 
the most remarkable periods in the history of the Alliance and 
Europe as well. The three Invited Countries went from being part 
of the Warsaw Pact to becoming members of NATO, within ten years. 
The Hungarian experience may be short, but having a full cycle of 
integration process (defense reform, collective force planning 
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and everything else) completed, they believe that the actual NATO 
membership is based on empirical and practical experiences. 
 
The smooth integration into an already working system 
presupposes certain conditions that were missing in Hungary even 
when it became a NATO-member. There were fundamental structural 
and doctrinal differences between Hungary and the old members of 
the Alliance. In spite of the several changes in the systems and 
the processes, Hungary had, and to some extent still has, several 
deficient areas hindering an easy-flowing co-operation with the 
Alliance and Partners.98  
 
The main structural problem lies in the national defense 
planning process. It is still not fully interoperable with the 
process used in NATO. In addition, several decisions have been 
made late or not have been made at all. The last deficiency is 
not a problem of the system, but a general shortage of financial 
resources. The national defense planning process is also hindered 
by the lack of appropriate political decisions or by a slow, 
cumbersome decision making process. The Hungarian political 
system lacks an active defense lobby that would be able to 
influence lawmakers and the public on the matters of Defense 
Policy. 
 
The situation is clearly demonstrated by the advance of 
military reforms. The HDF is under a continual transformation 
since the beginning of `90s. Transformation, however, often meant 
a simple cut of personnel without careful considerations to the 
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impact of these cuts, often rendering organizations ineffective. 
Only the personnel of the central HQs and their staffs 
increased.99 
 
Both the military and the civilian decision-makers had to 
realize that the real capabilities of the HDF are not always 
directly proportionate with funds spent on them annually. 
 
The transition from a centrally planned economy to one 
determined by market forces has caused major economic 
dislocations and adverse socio-political phenomena in 
HungaryMilitary leaders repeatedly announced that it 
was impossible to maintain the countrys defenses with 
the meager resources allocated them. Still, defense 
budgets continued to decline. Quite simply, reducing 
defense budgets was good politics ()In concert with 
these political preferences, Hungarys military budgets 
shrank form 3.5% of GDP in 1988 to 1.5% a decade later.  
As a result, the HDF became thoroughly impoverished.100 
 
 This realization forced a decision about the strategic 
review of the whole Hungarian Defense System. 
 
With the conversion of the governmental budgeting and 
accounting process and to contain the damage done by small 
defense budgets, a new defense planning system started to evolve 
in 1997, when Hungary was invited to the Madrid Summit.  In the 
early 1990s, under the direction of Defense Minister Lajos Für, 
a great deal of money was spent of useless nonessential items, 
such as replacements for communist era symbols and Western made 
automobiles for MOD bureaucrats.101 But the MOD has been more 
attentive to fiscal responsibility thus reducing its debt from 
Ft. 1.5 billion to Ft 830 million.102 The main challenge is to 
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reshape the national defense planning process, to make it 
compatible with both national governmental planning, and the NATO 
collective planning processes.  
 
A fundamental problem of the Hungarian governmental planning 
system is that it does not offer a realistic long-term program. 
According to the Act on state budgeting, there is a possibility 
to draw up different programs for modernization purposes. In 
reality, however, the possibility is only a theoretical one, 
because there is no legal guaranty for providing a budget, for 
the full span of a program. Instead it is written to cover only 
the first year of its implementation. It means that the MOD may 
start a costly program but may not be certain of finishing it 
according to the plans, or finishing it at all. 
 
Hungary is still wrestling with the legacy of a two parallel 
planning processes. The first serves the purposes of National 
Planning while the other operates in the collective planning 
process. The commonality of both plans is that they are developed 
by the same organizations based on the same database. However, 
the process of filling out the DPQ or defining national positions 
on the force proposals is still often seen as a parallel process 
to the national planning activities, instead of being deeply 
embedded in the national planning processes.103  
 
The planning process used by NATO was relatively a new arena 
for the Hungarian experts, because they lacked adequate training, 
and were not in a position to overview the whole process at a 
first glance, they could not adequately participate in the 
development of the new system, and to understand and translate 
NATO requirements. There have been difficulties in understanding 
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"NATO-language" both in terms of plain English and the special 
planning language. 
 
Working in the "NATO" environment constituted a great 
challenge for Hungarian planners who did not have the same 
planning tools as their NATO counterparts. Hungary also had 
problems with synchronizing its needs with NATO requirements. 
Sometimes, it was not even been able to clearly articulate its 
intentions and frustrations to make NATO partners understand the 
situation.  
 
Post-Communist transitions are generally more traumatic 
for armed forces than for other occupational strata.  
One of the problems is that the officers whom nascent 
democracies inherit from the past are tainted by their 
service of the Marxist-Leninist regime.104  
 
They bring with them the burden of the so-called "old style" 
thinking. The majority of the planners have a broad knowledge and 
experience but only to do the business in the old way. Also, only 
a few of them have the command of working-level English. On the 
other hand, there is a new generation of officers with proper 
English, but they lack the experience and the scope of knowledge 
on the HDF, necessary for performing a good job. 
 
While the MoD and the basic organizations of the DS have 
adequately prepared personnel, lower levels of the DS and the 
services have some shortage in this respect. This situation is 
expected to improve when the first group of officers nominated to 
NATO positions return and re-enter the national system.105 
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Working on the DPQ and the TFP has been a very useful and 
important learning process. It has proven that Hungarys Defense 
Planning System can work with NATO planning systems, and has 
demonstrated new requirements for the inter-ministerial decision 
making process.  
 
The development of the Hungarian Defense Forces which had to 
be implemented within the constrictions of the Defense Budget was 
an enormous challenge. With the withdrawal of 78,000 Soviet 
occupation troops, few understood that Hungary would be left 
without such fundamental defensive capabilities as protection of 
its airspace.106  
 
The general population was unaware that the countrys 
military doctrine was practically the same as the USSR, 
which fully disregarded Hungarian security imperatives 
and that Hungarians preparation for its defense was 
woefully inadequate.107  
 
However, financial constraints should not interfere with the 
determination to achieve major goals in a methodological fashion. 
For that reason Hungary determined immediate, short, mid and 
long-term tasks which concentrate on its special priorities and 
promote continuously the long term Defense Forces Development 
Tasks, and those other reforms that are militarily indispensable.  
 
The accession period was not long enough for sufficient 
personnel to achieve proficiency in English. Before the NATO 
accession, Hungary had to implement mass preparation on all 
levels within short amount of time. Another problem was that a 
limited number of officers and NCOs were available for language 
training and the increased duties due to NATO integration and 
military reforms created very serious challenges and pressure. In 
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order to participate fully in discussions and to become fully 
efficient NATO staff officers must have command of English, 
together with knowledge of military technical jargon. As a 
consequence of this, the MOD has to put emphasis on maintaining, 
and qualitatively increasing the language skills of its 
professional personnel. Development of English language training 
therefore is still a priority for the HDF.  
 
The military imperative to achieve a minimum level of 
military capability in the tight time scale prior to accession 
required an early release of classified information. NATO 
Nations' Security Authorities were generally reluctant to release 
documents within this short time, because the three new members 
were not fully prepared with the implementation of necessary 
physical and personal security measures.  
 
Because of NATO accession, it was an indispensable 
obligation to establish those organizations that guarantee the 
security of coded telecommunication, computer technical and data-
processing systems and networks in Hungary. It still has some 
shortcomings in this area. The biggest problem was the lack of 
adequate financial resources. With a shrunken budget, Hungary had 
to get through the difficulties caused a severe over 30%, 
decrease of her Gross Domestic Product after 1989and all sectors 
of society felt this crunch. The Hungarian peace dividend was 
that the security situation allowed Hungary to spend much less on 
defense than before. However, it took almost ten years to 
recognize that by simply trying to survive, eating up the 
reserves of the military and waiting for "better times" is not a 
viable option for the defense sector. 
 
During the accession talks, the main idea stressed by the 
Alliance was that force modernization and the integration process 
should not overload the national economy because it would be not 
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be in the best interests of either side. Stability was the key 
word during the development of the force proposals. But, at the 
same time, the proposals should constitute a reasonable challenge 
for the nation.108 
 
Looking back at the accession process as a member, Hungary 
realized that during the Accession, especially concerning some 
elements of the military segment, they were proceeding half-
blind. They had some information on expectations and 
requirements, but did not gain access to some of the most 
important information, mainly because of information security 
reasons. They did not have a comprehensive knowledge about 
special requirements, especially regarding Computer and 
Information Systems. They could not have accurate knowledge on 
the intricate details of force contribution due to the inability 
so guarantee the security of information at the corresponding 
classification. 
 
While analyzing the current situation, one should be aware 
of the fundamental differences between the military forces of the 
new members and the so-called old members. The old nations of the 
Alliance have several years of participation in collective 
decision-making. As a result, there has to be a higher level of 
congruence in the capabilities of this group then between the new 
and old members. The same goes for the requirements, procedures 
and the doctrines applied to the application of military forces. 
 
Regarding the new members the picture is quite different. 
The entire system from the highest political level to the level 
of the last private has been or should have been transformed for 
the purpose of gaining membership in NATO. As we Hungary sees it 
today, there is long road ahead for establishing a solid common 
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basis. It might even take ten years to reach the average NATO 
standards in all aspects.109 
 
International co-operation deserves special attention, since 
the feature of multi-nationality becomes increasingly important, 
which is also reflected in several NATO and PfP documents. But, 
international co-operation has more possibilities, than we make 
use of today. The three new members are always encouraged to 
enhance their co-operation in the current integration process. It 
is to be expected that the Partner Countries also will take a new 
initiative in deepening co-operation in the near future. 
 
Considering all of this is time to revamp and refresh the 
PfP. The future PfP cooperation is a two way street. It needs 
to focus on common interests and objectives and ensure the 
commitment of the PfP nations to the partnership. It must be 
realistic when considering the new security environment and PfPs 
importance cannot be overestimated.  
 
E.  HUNGARY’S PRIORITIES AND PERSPECTIVE OF PFP AS A NATO MEMBER 
 
No one member can be a mere consumer of security. 
Each must contribute to its production and maintenance. 
I am convinced that having become a member of the 
Alliance, we will increasingly be capable of beaming 
this stability beyond our borders, too.110 
 
Hungarys willingness to go forward in PfP co-operation is 
as strong as ever. PfP is one of the most successful NATO 
initiatives today, and according to the current practice of other 
NATO members Hungary remains an active participant of the PfP as 
an Ally as well. Hungarys continual engagement with PfP for two 
main reasons: first, contributing to the Alliance is a way to 
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support the efforts of the Alliance throughout Europe in the 
framework of PfP. Second, as a new member and previous Partner, 
it has responsibilities concerning the present Partner Nations. 
Also, by carrying out its national interest, Hungary definitely 
can benefit from the bilateral, multilateral and regional 
cooperation offered by the Partnership.  
 
Hungary is committed to supporting the EMOP, as an important 
initiative of Hungarys contribution to the stabilization of 
Central Europe, and the Carpathian basin, and especially the 
Balkans. In a wider perspective, EMOP serves as a generator for 
the building a cooperative security environment throughout the 
entire Continent.  
 
Hungary considers PfP as a complementary mechanism to 
prepare the Alliance for the further challenges of the 21st 
Century. PfPs transformation is also a major watershed in the 
course of preparation of the Alliance for new missions, such as 
crisis management, peace support operations or humanitarian 
actions, as it is envisaged in the actual Strategic Concept. 
 
Hungary views the open door policy and the ongoing 
integration as a major evolution process of NATO, in which PfP 
and the related MAP initiative must be further developed. From 
the Aspirants point of view, there is a need to deepen their 
active participation in the existing framework of EAPC, PFP and 
MAP. 
 
Hungary continues to increase and develop a financial basis 
for co-operation based on its political priorities and respective 
needs in various co-operation areas. As a NATO nation, Hungary 
needs to finance PfP programs that are essential to support NATO 
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interoperability of PfP Partner Nations, thus becoming a 
contributor to PfP initiatives and no longer merely a consumer.111  
 
Right after accession to NATO, Hungary reviewed the 
priorities of its bilateral PfP co-operation and reconsidered the 
basis of other Partner Nations participation in programs 
organized by Hungary. Hungary also considered extending the 
financial support of Partners when they participate in PfP 
activities either organized or hosted by Hungary. 
 
Whenever Hungary makes a decision to organize or host a PfP 
event, it evaluates the foreseeable political and military 
benefits of the program. Since the countrys resources are 
limited it is necessary to focus on certain PfP countries that 
are relevant to Hungarian interests, i.e. neighboring aspirant 
countries for NATO membership, neighboring Partner countries that 
need assistance, strategic partners and the other PfP countries 
when determining the needs of PfP co-operation. Meanwhile, a 
limited support of geo-strategically less important countries 
i.e., Middle-Asia, post Soviet countries in the Caucasus is 
necessary. With this in mind Hungary tries to provide bilateral 
assistance to some highly prioritized PfP partners. 
 
The ideas mentioned above are in line with Hungarys  
provider role that it has been emphasizing since the very 
beginning of its NATO membership. It is also in line with the 
existing practice of NATO, that, that the interests of both NATO 
members and PfP Partner Nations there is a significant amount of 
assistance programs on a bilateral basis. 
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The new initiatives in EMOP can easily be described 
mentioning their primary purpose: their role is to deepen co-
operation between NATO and its PfP Partners. It is essential to 
allow these initiatives to mature an a natural pace and 
accomplish most of these initiatives before it launches new ones, 
thus saving Partners from consequences of an initiative 
overload. It is also important, that these initiatives must not 
become purely theoretical or symbolic: besides the stated 
priorities, they must focus on the practical aspects of EMOP co-
operation. Hungary utilizes all possibilities to enhance such 
cooperation with PfP Partners. Whenever Hungary decides to 
develop PfP cooperation, improve the requirements towards our 
Partners, NATO always keeps in mind the individual needs, 
capabilities and resources of the particular partners. It is also 
essential to get proper two-way feedback from both NATO and PfP 
Partners to evaluate the success of the events. 
 
There are four major areas that Hungary focuses on in its 
PfP cooperation policy112: 
1. Utilization of consultation and mutual confidence building 
possibilities.  
It is essential to utilize the already existing consultation 
and confidence building possibilities in PfP. Being a NATO 
member nation, Hungarys responsibility is greater then 
ever. It is the mutual interest of both Hungary and our PfP 
Partner Nations to gain as much value of stability and peace 
as possible utilizing PfP co-operation.  
2. Enhancement of NATO interoperability of PfP Nations.  
Hungarys status in PfP has significantly changed since 
became a NATO member.  The changes can best be described by 
becoming providers, rather then consumers of PfP 
cooperation. Hungarys provider role needs to become a 
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primary characteristic of the cooperation. It can do this by 
enhancing its efforts concerning the development of PfP 
Nations NATO interoperability. There is a need to be able 
to mobilize more financial resources then ever in order to 
strengthen the donor role.  
3. Participation in Multinational NATO/PfP Formations in 
Peacekeeping and Crisis Management Operations.  
Examining the military aspects of PfP, the Multinational 
Formations (MF) have an increasingly important role. These 
Formations effectively contribute to the deepening of 
regional cooperation and strengthen confidence and security. 
The establishment of these Formations is one of the most 
significant milestones in the development of PfP and the 
successful development and deployment of MFs within the 
framework of close cooperation between NATO and Partners is 
gaining importance from the aspect of European Security. As 
a member of the Alliance, Hungary intends to utilize all 
possibilities in order to develop this kind of co-operation 
with the PfP Partners.  
Accordingly to the ideas laid down in NATOs new Strategic 
Concept, the non-Article Five operations are a growing 
challenge. The nature of threats possibly generating non-
Article Five operations will vary in scale and they might 
even come from regions far away from NATOs usual AOR. 
Therefore the security interests of Europe demand growing 
attention to successful building and sustainment of MFs 
within the boundaries of close co-operation with PfP Partner 
Nations. NATO will utilize all possibilities in order to 
develop such co-operation with Partners. Hungary attaches 
great importance to participation in MFs in NATO led 
Peacekeeping and Crisis Management Operations. The 
Hungarian-Romanian Peacekeeping Battalion, the Hungarian-
Romanian-Ukrainian Engineer Battalion, the Hungarian-
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Italian-Slovenian Brigade and CENCOOP are great examples of 
Hungarys commitment to participate in MFs. 
4. Bilateral assistance programs for the PfP Countries:  
Bilateral assistance programs are for the PfP Countries of 
Central-Eastern Europe in order to enhance the stability of 
the region. Currently the Hungarian-Albanian Bilateral 
Assistance Program is the most relevant program for Hungary 
within PfP. Hungarys participation in it is an important 
contribution to the settlement of the Kosovo crisis and to 
the security of the region.  
 
As far as the PfP itself is concerned, Hungary focuses on 
another four areas, which play a crucial role in achieving the 
required capabilities113: 
1. The PARP, which is parallel with the DPQ and the main tool 
for developing Partners forces and achieve interoperability 
objectives. 
2. The PfP exercises, through which the Partners may reach a 
better involvement in NATO planning process, and increase 
practical readiness for multinational operations. 
3. Preparation of the Partners experts and officers for 
involvement in NATO positions. The newly created positions 
require well-prepared national representatives, who can 
express NATOs needs to the seats of governments and can 
represent their own country at different NATO committees and 
commands. 
4. The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, that is 
related with development of the European regional force 
contingents and that is important in getting closer the ESDI 
and CESDP by obliging European security institutions to act 
for the peace. 
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F.  HUNGARY’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE NATO ENLARGEMENT 
 
Hungary supports the continuation of enlargement on 
moral grounds and on the that of her national 
interests. Accessions of the prepared countries in our 
region will, in turn, enhance our security situation. 
Currently, strategic aspects are being analyzed and 
consensus is being built. (...) We are firmly convinced 
that no prepared countries can be excluded from 
enlargement for reasons of geography or history. The 
position of the Bush-administration is outlined by the 
clear message the President sent to the candidate 
countries, in which he reaffirmed US commitment to the 
open-door policy of the Alliance.114 
 
 The Prague Summit was held right at the fourth anniversary 
of Hungarys introduction to the MAP process. This was an 
opportune time to review how far the MAP has come, assess its 
achievements and determine where its deficiencies are. It can 
then suggest what both allies and aspirants could do to make this 
process more efficient and credible. 
 
Hungarians, just like another Central Europeans, 
continue to believe in NATOs sustained relevance 
because its foundations are sound, and its members 
still see it as the ultimate guarantor of their 
security and a most efficient instrument for advancing 
their interests. Supporting the accession of its 
neighbors and other qualified candidates, Hungary finds 
it reassuring to see that the enlargement is right on 
track.115 
 
From the Hungarian perspective, the Membership Action Plan 
has proven to be almost surprisingly successful. The short 
evolution of MAP is an excellent example of how lessons learned 
can be put to good use. In 1999 at the last round of the NATO 
enlargement, the Alliance set up a structure and a logical 
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procedure for the NATO integration and put both the Allies and 
the candidates under considerable pressure. Time was a very rare 
commodity indeed, and many things had to be hastened. 
  
The MAP, although a predominantly technical program, has 
altered the security landscape in important parts of Europe. The 
MAPs most important value up to now has been the stabilization 
of the transfer process. Looking at Kosovo, countries in South 
Eastern Europe engaged on regional security cooperation to a 
degree that had been very hard to imagine just before the 
Washington Summit 1999. By now, the number of multinational 
security initiatives in the region are far greater than in the 
other European regions.  
 
The MAP, and the numerous events and discussions it produces 
have become an important tool in helping to foster a true spirit 
of cooperation between the Allies and Aspirants. The MAP 
initiative provides stability in other sense as well. In most 
aspirant countries, it provided valuable impetus for the so-
called strategic communities. Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 
Ministries of Defense, General Staffs and many other governmental 
institutions have begun to act in unison. 
  
The MAP cannot, of course, produce reforms on its own. But 
by asking aspirants to put together an Annual National Program 
(ANP), and by thus asking them to formulate coherent and 
transparent visions of their security policy and armed forces, it 
definitely acts as a catalyst. 
 
Hungary is well aware of the fact that the aspirants follow 
one crucial strategic national goal, i.e. their membership in the 
Alliance. Hungary supports the MAP and the process of competition 
it has initiated. NATO enlargement is not a goal in itself, but 
rather a means to an end. 
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From the Hungarian point of view, it is imperative that any 
future enlargement strengthens Alliance cohesion and military 
capabilities if it is centered on quality. Preserving cohesion 
and credibility should be the most important flag words of the 
future invitation. The Alliance has been able to do its job so 
successfully over the last decades precisely because its position 
was based on military credibility and on strong political support 
from each and every Ally. This must never be put at risk. 
 
Successful defense reform, efficient democratic control of 
the armed forces, high and sustainable public support, realistic 
budgets, decent quality of life for the military, and a high 
degree of interoperability are the technical essentials. The 
successful implementation of reforms in the aspirant countries is 
not merely a value in itself, but these reforms can only give 
further evidence of the development of transparency, 
predictability, and interoperability. This is why Hungary 
provides comprehensive bilateral military assistance in most 
aspirant countries, with a particular focus on democratic control 
of the armed forces. Hungarys role in the MAP process is very 
special, not limited merely to being an observer, but as a 
country which just went through along the whole circle of the 
integration, Hungary an advisor and a critic as well, trying to 
help guide further action both towards the candidates and Allies. 
 
Hungary has a well-founded interest in seeing all countries 
aspiring for NATO-membership fulfill the respective criteria as 
soon as possible and thus in seeing them become full-fledged 
members of NATO. This interest, however, is not limited to nice 





readiness and commitment to assist the efforts and endeavors of 
aspirant countries by sharing advice and experiences with them.116 
 
 The MAP is a very valuable tool in providing helpful 
guidance, to make preparations as efficient as possible. Such 
guidance may sometimes contain rather critical observations. Such 
views are not aimed at discouraging aspirants, on the contrary: 
they are meant to improve things. Furthermore, the more detailed 
and critical such observations get, the more serious a candidate 
an aspirant country has become. 
 
The aspirants can use the MAP as a roadmap to guide them.  
It helps NATO to assess how the progress of the aspirants. The 
introduction of MAP has marked a substantial step forward in the 
quality of the enlargement process, a tool that none of the 
countries admitted in previous rounds of enlargement had 
possessed. Also most importantly, a proof that the process of 
NATO enlargement is far from over. 
 
It is encouraging to note that all aspirant countries made 
their choice in favor of integration on the basis of their 
attachment to democratic values and rightly consider preparations 
for NATO-accession as a complex and demanding process 
encompassing all spheres of society. 
 
The MAP process has already led to the establishment or at 
least to the process of establishing the necessary structures and 
the conceptual basis for this preparatory process. It is now 
essential to make the most efficient use possible of these 
structures. 
 
                                                 
116   Babos, Tibor, NATO Enlargement, Presentation at International Conference, 
SVKI, Budapest, 12 December 2000. 
 66
Hungary consults bilaterally on specific aspects of the MAP 
or on a wider range of security issues. Hungary has announced 
that they are ready to assist to any aspirant country any time 
and on any issue, if they are approached by aspirants. The 
Hungarian Embassies in the aspirant countries are asked to 
continuously report on all relevant developments in the areas 
covered by the MAP, enabling the officials at home to evaluate 
the progress made and the challenges still to be met. Hungary is 
ready to send teams to consult on specific questions of a more 
technical nature and are generally very much open to any request, 
manpower and resources permitting. 
 
Regarding the more technical issues of Hungarys provider 
role, Hungary focuses on the following crucial points: 
• How realistic are the ANPs? One must assess the economic 
prospects in accordance with data provided from other 
sources; can Partnership Goals and defense reform plans 
be implemented within the indicated timeframe and budget? 
• How active is the engagement in regional efforts? Is 
there a discernible political will to settle long-
standing disputes? 
• What are the priorities of the public information 
campaigns? Are the publics prepared not only for the mere 
fact of possible NATO membership, but also for the costs 
and obligations, for the whole political, military, 
economic, social of membership? 
• Democratic control of forces: is it limited to having 
civilians work in the MOD and a civilian Minister of 
Defense, or does it stretch to Parliament? What are the 
competencies of the defense and security policy 
committees of the respective Parliaments? Is there a 
wide-ranging discussion of doctrine, is there a consensus 
on the overall aims of security policy? 
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• Doctrines: do they exist; how refined are they, are they 
published? We often find that the role of doctrines is 
underestimated. If carefully written and agreed to by the 
widest possible public consensus, doctrines will not just 
be collections of noble aims and highly moral rhetoric, 
but they will form the very basis of the whole security 
policy. Once a generally agreed doctrine is in place, all 
the other steps  reforms, even budgetary allocations -, 
tend to be more logical and easier to achieve. 
• Transparency: Is there a will to have a public discussion 
on sensitive security issues, is there a will to share 
information with others, are neighbors informed well 
ahead on relevant moves? 
• Arms control and export control: Implementation of 
treaties, control mechanisms. 
• Military preparedness: do the ANPs provide a realistic 
description of the structures and capabilities of the 
armed forces? Are key problems mentioned? 
• Partnership Goals: Do they form a package that can be 
handled, or are they overly ambitious? 
• Do procurement programs, reintegration programs, reforms 
and the like have a basis in corresponding budget 
allocations? Have these allocations already been 
rubberstamped by Parliament, and to what degree do they 
depend on uncertain profits (like, for example, from 
privatization, where we have our very own experience in 
judging probabilities)? 
 
There is no doubt successful MAP implementation requires 
enormous energies of both Candidates and Allies. Often painful 
processes must be initiated, social costs borne, consequential 
financial decisions taken. But to complete an Annual National 
 68
Program every year is the most important commitment an aspirant 
may take and definitely it is very much worth the effort.117 
 
Todays Allies and aspirants, maybe as tomorrows Allies, 
share the same goal: that of a community of nations based on the 
same values and beliefs, with a sense of responsibility not only 
for Hungarys security, but also for that of her neighbors. Based 
on this common goal, every involved country will successfully 
continue its cooperation within the MAP, the Partnership for 
Peace and the EAPC, to reach a higher quality of stability and 
security. 
 
Regional security is part of the goal of the United States 
Strategic Security Plan:  
 
The need to shape the environment through engagement. 
By engaging during peacetime, we shape the security 
environment, develop coalitions, help prevent crisis 
from occurring and deter violence and armed conflict.118 
 
The PfP has proven quite useful towards this goal. In 
addition to the PfP there is the SPP and Joint Contact Team 
Program (JCTP), which are promoted and administered by different 
entities but an operational synergy is created that helps 
maintain stability and security while providing an even more 
prosperous future for all of Europe. 
 
 





117   Ibid. 
118   Michael Dubie, The National Guard: Promoting United States National 
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IV.  THE STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: AMERICAN ENGAGEMENT 
TO COMPLEMENT THE PFP 
 
Michigans support has made a difference.  
The National Guard became very critical,  




Presi           
Vike-Freiberga, 
dent of Latvia 
A.  CREATION OF THE STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM 
 
When the Cold War provided the framework for the defense 
and security in Europe, ideology not only served to define and 
demarcate two camps, it also produced considerable 
misunderstanding between them.119  There are still many 
misunderstanding and lost opportunities to foster engagement and 
progress towards cooperation. As described by the former 
Secretary Defense William Perry in 1997, we are at a point 
between a Cold War that is over and a peace that is not yet 
secure.120 The former Warsaw pact countries were, and still are, 
faced with monumental challenges to establish political order and 
create market based economies. Former Secretary Perry continued 
with the assertion that America must lead the world in 
preventing the conditions for conflict and in creating the 
conditions for peace. In short, we must lead with a policy of 
preventative defense. The National Guard is being utilized to 
assist states in making the transition to democracies. The unique 
concept of citizen-soldier makes the Guards State Partnership 
for Peace Program a vital tool for this transition process. The 
National Guards SPP builds Bridges to America by providing 
vital links between emerging democracies and the U.S. 
 
                                                 
119  James Sherr. Dynamics of Shaping European Society 
www.ppc.pims.org/projects/NGB (11 May 2003)  
120  National Guard Bureau. A Bridge to America: The Citizen-Soldier Globally 
Engaged, Point Paper. 18 February 1998. 
http://www.ppc.pims.org/Projects/NGB/Program.html (21 February 2003) 
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 With the current crisis of the War on Terror at the 
forefront of National Security interests, the less visible issues 
of NATO enlargement, and democratization can seem to lose some 
its exigency.  But it is exactly these in issues  which the U.S. 
needs to remain engaged, thus the National Security Strategy has 
chosen to become more flexible and adaptable in these dynamic 
times.  One of the cornerstones for a secure world is a stable, 
openly communicative and cooperative Europe. 
 
 
                                                
With Russia no longer a direct threat and with its military 
nearly a shadow of its former self, the U.S. military has become 
the implementing force of peacetime U.S. National Security 
Strategy.  The United State European Command (USEUCOM) has 
developed a variety of peacetime programs to remain engaged with 
newly Independent States throughout Eastern Europe. Increased 
operational tempos and reduced resources have undermined the 
ability to pursue these programs without drawing upon additional 
reserve forces and, in particular the capabilities of the 
National Guard.121  The National Guard has been an important actor 
in enhancing USEUCOMs role in Strategic Peacetime Security 
Operations. Guidance from the National Command Authorities, as 
expressed by the National Security Strategy and the National 
Military Strategy emphasizes the trend toward shaping the 
international environment through engagement. The National Guard 
has worked through the Joint Contact Teams (JCTP) and the 
Military Liaison Team(MLT) by making up half of the manning of 
these programs.122  Since 1992 the U.S. Citizen Soldier has made a 
significant contribution to national security through engagement. 
It has helped to prevent the emergence of new threats to the 
United States and deter the re-emergence of former threats by 
assisting over thirty countries to establish democratic 
 
121  Michael Dubie, The National Guard, Promoting United States National 
Security: A Case Study. Air War College, Air University 
122  Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of 
the Czech and Russian Armed Forces, (Michigan, The University of Michigan 
Press, 1999), p.61. 
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governments, develop free-market economies and reorganize their 
post-Cold War militaries to better reflect a democratic system.  
The umbrella program for this initiative is the State Partnership 
for Peace (SPP). The JCTP has increasingly relied on Reserve 
Components resources to staff its events and the SPP 
participation has increased from four percent in FY 1993 to 
thirty percent in 1996.123 
 
 However, the program seems to be some sort of secret to all 
concerned.  Many National Guard units are barely aware of SPP or 
are only partially familiar with their foreign partner countries.  
It is not just the Guard that has suffered from this information 
vacuum, but all branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, State/National 
politicians and policy makers and their counter-parts in the 
partner nations are uninformed as well. All concerned need to be 
educated about this unique and innovative program. Though it has 
been highly praised by both military and civilians involved, it 
has not gained widespread recognition. It is growing in not only 
the number of countries participating but it is also evolving 
from within as it reaches new points in its lifecycle.  
 
 
                                                
In the early 1990s, as the Partnership for Peace Programme 
was taking shape within the framework of the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council, the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff General Colin Powell and the Commander in Chief of the 
European Command General John Shalikashvili sought to answer the 
questions that arose as to how to fulfill the strategic void 
created by the fall of the Soviet Union. The disappearance of the 
monolithic threat demanded that USEUCOM and NATO rapidly needed 
to transform their framework and focus on fostering democracy to 
retain stability throughout Europe. Keeping Americas Alliance 
with Europe at the core of U.S. foreign relations is a matter of 
strategic pragmatism.  Clearly the Euro-Atlantic synergism is a 
 
123 State Partnership Stockholders Report, EUCOM: March 1997, p. 6. 
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resource for the future and can best be developed by pioneering 
efforts of partnership and cooperation.  
 
 SPP began when the Eastern Bloc collapsed. It emerged out 
of the early military to military contact teams that U.S. sent to 
Poland and Hungary in 1991.124  Retired Lt. General John Conaway 
was responsible for helping to create the program during his term 
as the National Guard Bureau Chief from 1990-1993. In 1992 the 
government of Latvia asked for help in developing a national 
military based on the National Guard Model of the Citizen 
Soldier. Lt. General Conaway with the approval of the Chairman of 
the Joint Chief of Staff, seized the opportunity, and Michigan 
agreed to serve as the partner of Latvia. According to Conaway, 
he knew:  
 
The program had the potential like it did.  Active 
Forces going in over there would not have gone well. It 
would have sent the wrong signal to Russia.  The 
Russians were still looking warily at these emerging 
countries. The National Guard was the perfect vehicle 
because of our dual status.125 
 
 
At the same time, USEUCOM was working on finalizing its 
plan for military contacts in Central and Eastern Europe. An 
alliance between these two groups was formed to garner the 
congressional support necessary to fund the contacts beyond 
the first year when CINC initiative funds would be spent. It 
was agreed that the National Guard would take the lead in 
contact with the Baltics, but their initiative would fall 
under the umbrella of   USEUCOM Military to Military Contact 
ProgramJCTP.126 
  
                                                 
124  Chris Madaloni, Reaching Around the World, National Guard Magazine, July 
2000 p. 19. 
125  Ibid, p. 19. 
126  Joseph Geddes, Lt Colonel, U.S. Army National Guard, Bridge to  America: 
National Guard Support of the U.S. EUCOMs Joint Military to Military 
Contact Programs. paper prepared for Amy War College, May 1994, p. 12. 
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 SPP stresses the development of democratic institutions, 
especially the concept of a democratic civilian controlled 
military.  This is a foreign concept to many former dictatorships 
or Soviet Republics. In fact, insight into the structure and 
operation of the National Guard remains the programs primary 
draw.127  
 
 Because the Guard typically retains its personnel on a 
continuing basis, it is a natural fit to develop long-term 
relationship with its host countries.  The Guard also taps all 
levels of society, from police officers and state workers to 
federal management.128 Originally the countries were paired with 
states on the basis of ethnic ties, and climatic, geographic and 
economic factors.  Its success has spurred the growth to 




                                                
EUCOMs alliance with the National Guard and Reserve Forces 
was a necessary concession for securing the support needed to 
ensure the continuation of its own efforts in the region.  EUCOM 
program developers realized that the National Guard Bureaus 
(NGB) ability to lobby congressional support exceeded their own 
and would be an essential element in the JCTP getting off the 
ground.  There have also been fears throughout the life of the 
JCTP that its funding would not be renewed from year to year, but 






127  Chirs Madaloni, Reaching Around the World, National Guard Magazine,   July 
2000 p. 20. 
128  Ibid., p. 20. 
129  Ulrich, p. 61. 
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B.  CURRENT SPP OPERATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH PFP 
 
 In Europe, the SPP falls under the authority of USEUCOM. The 
area of Responsibility of USEUCOM now covers more than 13 
million square miles and includes 91 countries and territories.  
This territory extends from the North Cape of Norway, through the 
waters of the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas, most of Europe, 
parts of the Middle East to the Cape of Good Hope in South 
Africa.130 
 
General Joseph Ralston, the current ESACEUR/CINCEUR states: 
 
Above all, USEUCOMs AOR is dynamic, with new 
opportunities and new challenging situations regularly 
emerging.  USEUCOM missions are themselves complex and 
dynamic () We do all of this with minimal force 
presence and a moderate level of resources.131 
 
 
                                                
General Ralston clearly emphasizes the important role of the 
National Guard and that the SPP plays in the Strategic Security 
of the European Theater.  According to General Ralston: 
 
Considering the scope of our mission, along with the 
size and diversity of our AOR, we rely extensively on 
support from several organizations I would like to 
point out the contributions of a couple of these 
organizations, in particular upon which we rely daily. 
The variability of USEUCOMs mission and requirements 
demand full access to the total spectrum of Service 
Capability offered by the reserve componentsReserve 
component forces are a primary source of manpower for 
USEUCOM Joint Contact Team Programs and the PfP 
exercise program.  Another important Security 
Cooperation Program carried out by the reserve forces 
is the State Partnership Program which assists partner 




130  www.USEUCOM.MIL (12 April 2003) 
131  General Ralston. Defending Freedom Fostering Cooperation and Promoting 
Stability. Feb 28 2001. www.USEUCOM.MIL (2 March 2003) 
132  General Ralston. www.EUCO.mil/Standard_html (19 April 2003) 
 76
In the same speech, General Ralston highlighted the fact 
that the SPP has blossomed into an association encompassing 
nearly every facet of society-unit partnership, sister cities, 
student exchanges, scientific collaboration and business ties.  
He points out that this ability to interact with other partner 
nations in all sectors of society is the key strength of SPP. It 
has acted as a stabilizing influence in the USEUCOM AOR and will 
continue to do so in years to come.133 
 
 General Ralston mentioned the Joint Contact Team in his 
address.  The Joint Contact Team has been the first step of 
engagement of the SPP process.  The objective is to bring 
American ideals and democratic values to the countries from the 
former East Bloc and newly independent states.  It is supposed to 
provide essential infrastructure-building information while 
presenting the U.S. Armed forces as a role model of a capable 
military under effective civilian control134 
  
The Military Liaison Team is the primary component of the 
Joint Contact Program Team. MLTs are made of 4 person joint teams 
of U.S. personnel that are stationed in host nations.   
 
The MLT members live and work in the host nations apart 
from the U.S. Embassy interfacing primarily with the 
Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.135  
 
MLT Chiefs are usually senior officers from Active 
Components or members of the National Guards partner U.S. state. 
MLTs are often the first military contact with many of the 
burgeoning nations. It is through this initial contact that 
bonds of trust and mutual respect can begin to be built between 
                                                 
133  Ibid. 
134  Joint Contact Team Program (n.p.) p.1  www.EUCOM.mil (11 February 203) 
135  Ibid. 
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the U.S. and the host nations.136  The MLTs job is to coordinate 
events that are associated with SPP in the USEUCOM AOR.  The 
collapse of the Soviet Union opened a window of opportunity for 
military-to-military contact, said Marine Colonel Randy 
Bucknell, Deputy Program Chief.  At the time, there were no U.S. 
Embassies in most of these countries.137  Bucknell continued by 
saying One of the programs current objectives is promoting 
closer ties with NATO. Today, teams are helping NATOs newest 
invitees the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland upgrade their 
military infrastructure and meet alliance standards.138 
 
 The National Guard SPP is a bi-lateral engagement program 
with the following objectives: 
• Build democratic institutions 
• Promote regional stability 
• Foster free market economies 
• Project democratic values 
• Promote interoperability 
• Promote mutual understanding139 
 
The links between the partners begins with the State 
Governor and his or her National Guard and the Ministry of 
Defense and members of the armed forces of the participating 
nation. But it is the grass-roots nature of the program, which 
makes it effective and enables long-term relationships between 
the partners. 
 
The aforementioned MLTs play an integral role in executing 
SPP events.  Travel Contact Teams (TCT) are also a component of 
                                                 
136  Michael Dubie, The National Guard, Promoting United States National 
Security: A Case Study. Air War College, Air University 
137  Linda Kozaryn, American Forces Information Services 
www.Defenselink.mil/news/Apr 1008/N04141998 (19 March 2003) 
138  Ibid.  
139  LTC Walter Lord, Microsoft Power Point Presentation, slide 3, National 
    Guard Bureau Office of International Affairs. 
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the process.  TCTs are Guardsmen who travel to host nations to 
give briefings on civil-military topics such as air search and 
rescue, medical evacuation, personnel, budgeting, administration, 
military law, professional military education, disaster response 
planning and family programs.140 
 
But what begins as a formal meeting often turns into a close 
and informal relationship between guardsmen and members of the 
armed forces of the host nations.  In addition to the TCTs, host 
nations send military members on FAM Visits to the U.S. The 
exchange of information is important on FAMS, but like the TCT 
missions, the contact between the personnel from both sides of 
the Atlantic is the enabler for the construction of long standing 
affiliations.141  It is by this close contact and sharing of 
military operations and the civilian way of life can the Guard 
make its compelling case for the ideals of democracy, 
professionalism, and deference to civilian authority.142 
 
Military Liaison teams, assigned permanently in the host 
country, can participate in a wide range of activities and 
projects. The National Guards Military Liaison Teams  
 
(D)evelop work plans with host country ministries of 
defense and with US embassy staff. Each plan specifies 
assistance required by the host-nation to carry out 
democratic reforms provides a context with which U.S. 
strategic objectives can be pursued.143 
 
Cooperation from emerging and maturing democracies may 
prove particularly important in countering asymmetric 
                                                 
140  Lt.Col. C.A. Reimer, National Guard Bureau Director of International 
Affairs, Information Paper-The National Guard State Partnership Program, 
p. 1. 
141  Michael Dubie, The National Guard, Promoting United States National 
Security: A Case Study. Air War College, Air University, p. 21. 
142  Lt.Col. C.A. Reimer, National Guard Bureau Director of International 
Affairs, Information Paper-The National Guard State Partnership Program, 
p. 1. 
143  LTC Bruce Oliveira, The Citizen Soldier in the United States National 
Security Calculus,  The United States Army War College, Carlisle 
Barracks, PA. 2001. p. 13. 
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threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of 
chemical and biological weapons.  Capable and committed 
associate nations can assist the U.S. in a myriad of 
ways ()144  
 
Though these partner nations might not come close to the 
U.S. military strength, they can provide us with intelligence, 
join in economic sanctions, use their own criminal justice system 
and stand by us in out fight against terrorism, drug trafficking 
and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). 
 
Because of the programs success it has been expanded beyond 
the European theater.  There is an established process for new 
partnerships.  First, the potential partner nation makes its 
requests through the U.S. Embassy.  The Ambassador approves the 
request and forwards it the CINC. Once the request is approved by 
the CINC, it is forwarded thru the Joint Staff to an Interagency 
Working Group (IWG).  The IWG approves it and passes it to Chief 
of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) for concurrence and assignment 
to a partner state. The National Guard Bureau reviews the 
applications of interested states and recommends the best match. 
Finally, the Chief, NGB selects the Partner State returns back 
down the chain thus initiating SPP activities. 
 
The framework set up to support SPP spans the United States 
and the world. The National Guard Bureau International Affairs 
Office (NGB-IA)is tasked with keeping the SPP operating smoothly.  
The NGB-IA is composed of Theater Branch Chiefs/Desk Officers 
located in Washington D.C. There is a SPP Coordinator at each 
Partner State HQ.  In country is the MLT.  The NG General Officer 
Steering Committee (GOSC) ensures National Guard involvement in 
international activities and input is provided from Senior 
National Guard Advisors to theater/component commands.  
 
 
                                                 
144 Ibid., p.13. 
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C.   LIFE CYCLE AND FUNDING OF SPP 
 
Even though the National Guard is the proponent of the SPP, 
funding the program is provided from many different sources 
depending on the type of event being planned and executed.  
National Guard Operations and Maintenance funds, Overseas 
Deployment Training, Temporary Tour of Active Duty (TDY), 
Mobility Training Teams fro Security Assistance, PfP Warsaw 
Initiative Funds, Cooperative Threat Reduction, International 
Aid, Joint Chief Staff Exercises Program and the participating 
nations all contribute funding to the appropriate events or 
projects. 
 
The EUCOM SPP Life Cycle Model demonstrates how the SPP 
relationship develops over time from initiation to maturation.  
It shows how EUCOM will apply resources to the partnership and 
how funds from NGB, other military sources, state agencies and 
non-governmental sources (NGOs) may be applied in a coordinated 
effort to achieve US and European objectives.  The model breaks 
down the life cycle of the SPP program into three different 
phases:  The Initial Phase, the Sustainment Phase and the 
Maturity Phase.  
 
The Initial Phase is characterized as the gradual 
introduction and development of a mutually beneficial 
relationship between a designated U.S. state and its designated 
partner nation.145 It is during this phase that activities are 
mainly traditional mil-to-mil activities of short duration and a 
limited number of personnel with the goal being familiarization.  
Initially the relationship is established with EUCOM funds from 
sources available to CINCUER. Primarily Traditional CINC 
Activity (TCA) funds are used to establish and sustain SPP 
                                                 
145  LTC Dietrich, Life Cycle of the National Guard State Partnership Program 
in the U.S. European Command, HQ USEUCOM/ECRA, p. 2. 
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partnership activities.146 It is at this point that a three year 
SPP plan is developed with input from the partner nation, the 
partner state, the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), the EUCOM 
staff and NGB International Affairs.  NGB starts to fund special 
events in this phase and states begin to introduce their 
government officials to the program and attempt to involve 
civilian organizations as well. 
 
 The Sustainment Phase is the active growth and flowering of 
the relationship between the partners in a respective SPP to 
achieve maximum, positive impact on U.S.  and EUCOM 
objectives.147 It is now that EUCOM security cooperation campaign 
plan activities an funding increase to a steady level in pursuit 
of strategic objectives.  The activities grow from just mil-to-
mil to include civilian contact as well and civilian funding is 
incorporated into the funding as well.  Typical events during the 
Sustainment Phase are unit exchanges, combined training events, 
educational tours and other host nation/partner state exchanges. 
  
Finally, the Maturity Phase is reached. this phase of the 
SPP is characterized as a maturation of the partnership that 
allows transition from a relationship based on military oriented 
activities to one based on civilian activities.148  It is during 
this phase that a consensus is reached that partner nation 
governments have achieved U.S., EUCOM and European objectives and 
are characterized by having secure, stable relationships with the 
U.S. and the rest of the world community.   
 
Maturity is determined by EUCOM based on relevant 
political/military indicators.  Emphasis shifts away 
from military activities and towards more civilian 
oriented interaction between partners. EUCOM funding 
decreases to fund a small number of military events in 
the partner nation, to maintain the established, 
                                                 
146  Ibid, p.2. 
147  Ibid. 
148  Ibid, p. 3. 
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positive relationships that enhance access and military 
interoperability.149 
 
Events are planned based on the needs of the partner 
nations, the SPP partner states, EUCOM and the U.S.  In this 
phase, sources of funding from civilian agencies are primarily 
used to maintain the SPP partnership. In this phase sources of 
funding from civilian agencies are primarily used to maintain the 
SPP partnership. NGB funding continues as funds allow. The 
partner state may become available to initiate a new Partnership 
and begin the cycle again.150  It is during this phase that the 
partner state may become available to initiate a new partnership 
with the AOR at EUCOMs request and begin the cycle again.  In 
the case of Ohio and Hungary, there is some discussion of the two 
partners joining together to work with a third nation, Morocco.151  
 
D.   MINUTEMAN EXCHANGE PROGRAM 
 
 
                                                
The Minutemen Fellow Exchange Program is another innovative 
approach to foster engagement and cooperation.  
 
The Minuteman Fellows concept demonstrates the National 
Guards core engagement competency-Military Support to 
Civil Authority (MSCA)- through an immersion experience 
hosted by the National Guard enhances the prospects for 
mutual trust, respect and understanding between the 
United States and its friends and allies.152   
 
These programs are characterized by a two-way flow of information 
and provide a basis for developing strong, long-term 
interpersonal relationships. They are divided into National 
Defense, Military Support to Civilian Authorities and Civilian 
 
149     Ibid. 
150  Col. Max Brewer, Life Cycle of the National Guard State Partnership 
    Program in EUCOM (memo March 7,2002, EUCOM National Guard Program, The  
    Next Generation Conference, March 20-21, 2002). 
151  Interview with Mr. Vanas, OHANG SPP Coordinator and Linda Royer July 2002) 
152  Minuteman Fellows Program Concept, p. 1. National Guard Bureau Office of 
International Affairs. 
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Skills fellowship categories.153  The strongest acknowledgement of 
this need is the Expanded International Military Education and 
Training (E-IMET) program, which recognizes that-on order to 
advance U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives-
foreign government and civilian personnel often warrant access to 
U.S. military training.154   
 
 At the EUCOM State Partnership Program planning workshop 
held in June 2002 the Next Generation was the focus of SPP.  
The events of September 11th 2001 have propelled the Global War 
on Terrorism to the forefront of National Security Strategy and 
SPP is positioned to play in integral role in this fight.  
Because SPP has promoted strong ties between states and their 
host nation a natural a necessary transition from engagement to 
Security Cooperation can transpire. 
 
 
                                                
For example, SPP partnership in two former Soviet 
Republics, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan helped facilitate the 
deployment of 4000 U.S. and Allied troops to the area to support 
operations against Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in 
Afghanistan.155  
 
Concerning Hungary, Taszar Air Base was the training 
location used by Task Force Warrior to train Iraqi opposition 
volunteers to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Training 
was conducted in two phases. The first concentrated on basic 
skills such as self-defense, drills, Law of Armed Conflict, 
Geneva Conventions and ethical decision-makingIn the second 
phase the volunteers learn a variety of skills on the conduct of 
civil-military operations.156 
 
153   V.I. Iiams., The State Partnership Program: An Overview, presentation by   
National Guard Bureau International Affairs, 1999. 
154   Minuteman Fellowship Program, p. 1. 
155   The Yankees are Coming, Economist, January 17, 20002. P A-12. 
156   http://www.defenseline.mil/mews/March2003/t01342003_t0314barno.html (17 
March 2003) 
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As NATO expansion continues (in part due to the work of the 
SPP) there will be more members available to contribute to 
various peacekeeping operations and other MOOTW, which can have 
an indirect positive effect on the war on terror.  
 
Current U.S. efforts to help stabilize and democratize 
the government in post-Taliban Afghanistan are a case 
in point. When Slovenia and other aspiring NATO 
peacekeepers are assigned SFOR or Kosovo force in the 
Balkans, they effectively free other NATO members to 
participate in peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere.157 
 
Though it is difficult to quantify the precise contribution 
that SPP has made to the War on Terror, one can point out areas 
where SPP has made an obvious positive impact. The classical idea 
of military deterrence is no longer applicable when dealing 
with terrorist organizations. Therefore, U.S. forces may need to 
intervene rapidly-sometimes even preemptively where we have not 
had a part presence or military alliance. It is a more then 
likely that we will have to act in a Coalition force we must be 
able to enlist reliable and ready help from our partners.158 
 
E.  STATE EFFORTS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL INTERESTS 
 
The SPP has proven to be an effective tool to prepare 
emerging democracies in the former Warsaw Pact in the Membership 
Action Plan and/or to become members of NATO.  But there are 
other initiatives that can be a model for nascent democracies as 
well.  
 
The unique federal-state partnership has resulted in 
the emergence of a small but potentially influential 
state-level constituency, including state governors and 
legislators as well as National Guard Officials, who 
can directly attest to the benefits of U.S. democracy 
building abroad. This constituency increasingly extends 
                                                 
157   Bill Owens and Troy Eid, Strategic Democracy Building: How U.S. States  
    can help. The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2002. p. 163. 
158  Ibid., p. 163-164. 
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beyond state government to include leaders in the 
business and nonprofit sectors who develop 
international contacts through SPP and sometimes 
graduate into more extensive commercial contracts.159 
 
State governors can effectively advocate democratic reforms 
within emerging nations, and they can speak with attestation to 
nations leaders about the realities of a democracy at the grass 
root level. As the states chief executives, governors like 
national leaders, are typically judged on the results of their 
policies and programs. They are in touch with a broad 
constituency. They must lead large bureaucracies and interact on 
a daily basis with elected legislators. Because governors can 
identify with some of the large problems and challenges that 
elected leaders face in emerging democracies, they can bring a 
credible and practical approach to conversations about 
institutional reform and procedural improvement.160 
 
The SPP program has much potential to serve both federal and 
state interests.  Closer integration of state governments into 
strategic democracy building policies would broaden political and 
public support for such endeavors and goals. States directly gain 
from participating in SPP by the training it provides for their 
own National Guard units and indirectly by the access and 
contacts made via the programs. Also, it costs the states very 
little to participate since Washington pays almost the entire 
bill in the form of direct Congressional appropriations to the 
NGB, including virtually all the costs of each state National 
Guard unit participation in the SPP.161 
 
Based on its initial success, the SPP can be expanded if the 
federal government is willing to assist in directing and funding 
civilian and state initiatives. Professional exchanges and 
traveling contact teams of various state agencies and NGOs could 
                                                 
159  Ibid., p. 165. 
160  Ibid.     
161  Ibid., p. 166. 
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continue to foster democratic growth while helping the United 
States to meet its foreign policy objectives. 
 
 It is at this point where Hungary and Ohio can share their 
lessons learned and be an archetype for future NATO aspirants. 
Their case study will provide useful examples of the importance 
of committed military-to-military contact, but also emphasize how 
crucial it is to have the civilian sector involved and committed 
to the growth and attainment of the both nations security 
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V. THE OHIO AND HUNGARY CASE STUDY 
 
The Republic of Hungary and the State of Ohio have 
developed an exemplary cooperation in many fields, 
including the military to military exchange between the 
Home Defense Forces and the Ohio National Guard. It has 
played an important role in deepening interoperability 
and setting higher standards for the Hungarian armed 
forces, and through that, it has been instrumental in 
reaching the level of military capability expected from 
us by the Alliance. 162                           
 
Ohios SPP program, which began over a decade ago, is one of 
the oldest and most successful of this National Guard program.  
Much of its success is due to the long-standing connection 
between Ohio and Hungary. These ties go beyond just military and 
governmental agreements, but are part of a network between the 
people of both the state of Ohio and the Nation of Hungary. 
 
A.  HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OHIO AND HUNGARY 
 
Of all the states in the Union, Ohio has the largest 
population of Hungarians, almost a quarter million Hungarian 
Americans are residing in North East Ohio alone. One out of every 
seven Hungarians in the U.S. lives in Ohio. The largest influx of 
Hungarians to Ohio came between 1956-1958, especially members of 
the Freedom Fighters of infamous 1956 Revolution.  Cleveland, at 
one time, had the largest populations of Hungarians outside of 
the capital city of Budapest.163  Testimonials to the Hungarian 
presence in Ohio can been seen all over the state, and especially 
in the Cleveland area.  A large statue of Louis Kossuth, a 
Hungarian Liberator of the 1848 Revolution stands in a prominent 
position in Clevelands prestigious University Circle.  In 
                                                 
162   Dr. Gyorgy Banlaki, Ambassador of Hungary, Letter to Governor George 
Voinovich, June 30, 1997. 
163   Dr. August Pust, Notes for The Briefing to the Governor-Hungary-Ohio, 
dated March 23,1998. 
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addition, next to the Cleveland Municipal Utilities building is 
the Cardinal Mindszenty Plaza and statue, which is a vivid 
witness of Ohios support of Human Rights while Hungary was under 
Soviet Occupation. 
 
Hungarian Americans have been well integrated into Ohios 
culture, with numerous social clubs, professional leagues, radio 
programs and even sports organizations. For the past thirty years 
the Hungarian World-Wide Congress has been held in Ohio. The 
Hungarian Business Development Panel, which exchanges staff from 
the renowned Cleveland Clinic with Hungarian medical 
professionals, is Headquartered in Cleveland.  
 
Where art and culture in concerned, the distinguished George 
Szell conducted the Cleveland Orchestra from 1946 until 1970 and 
Christoph von Dohnanyi's tenure as the Orchestra's sixth Music 
Director was from 1984 to 2002. The Ohio Arts Council provides 
funding for Ohio Hungarian Performing Groups, particularly the 
Csardas Dance Troupe from Cleveland. The Cleveland Playhouse 
hosted the Hungarian National Theater from Miskolc and in return, 
sent their dance troupe to Hungary to perform. 
 
There have been two sister-city relationships created 
between Ohio and Hungary. One is between Toledo and the city of 
Szeged and the other is between Cleveland and the second largest 
city in Hungary, Miskolc. 
 
Ohio and her Hungarian Community have promoted and continue 
to promote international exchange programs. The following is a 
short, but not an all inclusive, list: 
• Case Western Reserve University/School of Law, which has 
developed a Hungarian Legal Resource Center with Eotvos 
Lorand University in Budapest. 
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• Ohio-Hungary Sister State relationship support 
foundation. 
• Columbus School for Girls, relationship with Sandor 
Petofi Primary English School in Kecskemét. 
• United Way, Ohio Chapter is currently developing a joint 
venture program with the United Way in Hungary.164 
 
As early as 1992, Ohio was assisting Hungary with much 
needed aide due to the war in the Former Yugoslavia. Hungary was 
the first recipient of Ohios 1992s Overseas Medical Supplies 
Mission with a total of 70 tons of supplies with a value of over 
$10 million for refugees and people in need. A second mission 
took place in 1993.165 
 
In 1994, Hungarian Educational Professionals visited Ohio to 
receive training in the Head Start Program. They returned to 
Hungary to establish an early childhood education program. In 
addition, Ohio is working with the Hungary to establish a program 
entitled Community Based Services for Children with Special 
Health Care Needs.166 
 
With this strong environment of cooperation and bond between 
Ohio and Hungary, it was a natural choice for the Ohio National 
Guard to choose Hungary as their partner nation. On July 27, 
1993, Lieutenant General John B. Conway sent a Memorandum to 
Major General Richard Alexander, the Adjudant General of Ohios 
National Guard. It confirmed Ohios selection to represent the 
United States and the National Guard Bureau for the Ministry of 
Defense of Hungary. In 1993 this was considered a substantial 
                                                 
164   Ibid. 
165   Interview with Dr. Agugust Pust on November 3, 2001. 
166   Dr. August Pust, Notes for The Briefing to the Governor-Hungary-Ohio, 
dated March 23,1998. 
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non-traditional responsibility[when] Ohio stepped forward to 
volunteer for this important and historic challenge167 
 
B.  GOVERNOR’S ROLE  
 
Senator George Voinovich, the former Mayor of Cleveland and 
Governor of Ohio, was keenly instrumental in Ohio being selected 
as Hungarys State Partner. He has a long-standing record 
concerning Hungarian issues. He was a leader of the battle to 
prevent the return of St. Stephens crown to Soviet Occupied 
Hungary and as Mayor of Cleveland, he issued proclamation in 
observance of human rights and Hungarian Independence Day, flying 
the Hungarian Flag over City Hall. After receiving numerous 
honors from various Hungarian organizations, he was the only 
civilian American, after President Reagan to receive the 
Decoration of the Grand Cross medal from the World Federation of 
Hungarian Veterans for honoring and preserving the dignity of 
the Holy Crown.168 During a Business Mission to Hungary in April 
of 1993 his efforts were recognized by receiving the Middle Cross 
of the Order of Merit of the Republic of Hungary, the highest 
medal awarded to civilians. It was presented to him by the 
Hungarian foreign minister Dr. Geza Jeszenszky on behalf of 
Hungarian President Dr. Arpad Goncz.169 
 
Support for admission to NATO was provided by Governor 
Voinovich, as he worked closely with the leadership of ethnic 
organizations of Hungarian, Polish and Czech communities.170 In 
June of 1997, a special resolution supporting NATO membership for 
these countries was created and a special request letter was sent 
from Governor Voinovich to Secretary of State Madeline Albright.  
                                                 
167   Memorandum from Lt Gen John Conway dated 27 August 1993,  Subject Ohio 
State Partnership with Hungary. 
168  Interview with Dr. Pust on Novemeber 03, 2001. 
169  Interview with Dr. August Pust, Nov 03, 2002. 
170  Dr. August Pust, Ohio Hungarian Relationship: Support and Partnership for 
Admission to NATO. December 29, 1999 
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It emphasized that NATO membership for these nations would 
further promote on-going and new business, as well as other 
relationships. There are essential components to creating long-
lasting peace and stability needed in the region to re-integrate 
these nations with the rest of Europe and to set a precedent for 
other nations in the region in the future.171 
 
It was during Governors Voinovichs administration that the 
Ohio-Hungary Military-to-Military exchange program was created, 
and due to its success, expanded.  It facilitated opportunities 
to link the Ohio National Guard as citizen soldiers of Ohio to 
Military organizations in Hungary. Its objective was to exchange 
information, assistance and most importantly, long-term personal 
and professional relationships. 172 
 
C.  OHIO’S SPP, THE FIRST YEARS 
 
Ohio hit the ground running as soon as the SPP was 
established. The first few years were a flurry of cooperative 
activity between both the nation of Hungary and the state of 
Ohio. This proactive initiative laid the groundwork for the 
future success of the program. 
 
Ohios SPP began with a mil-to- mil contact event in January 
1995. Its purpose was to assist the Hungarian MOD overhaul their 
legal documentation that is required for regulating the 
specialized issues of military justice. Special items of 
attention were the punitive powers of the commanders and the 
judicial review process.173 It also examined the military court 
system, the civil and individual rights of soldiers and closely 
                                                 
  After Action Report:  Event No: HU396, Military Law Familiarization, 24 
January- 4February 1995. 
171  George Voinovich, Letter to Secretary of State Madeline Albright.  June 
11, 1997. 
172  Dr. August Pust, Ohio Hungarian Relationship: Support and Partnership for 
Admission to NATO. December 29, 1999. 
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investigated the details of the military punishment system. 
Participants who came to Ohio included Col Laszlo Mezei, the 
Deputy Chief of Military Prosecution and Col Gyorgy Szekely, the 
Chief Military Prosecutor in the Budapest. They met with Dr. 
August Pust, from Governor Voinovichs Office of International 
Affairs and LTC Joseph Skeleton, the Ohio National Guard Staff 
JAG. This began a series of meetings that were continued in 
Hungary to ensure that the new Hungarian Legal System was 
compatible with Western systems, commensurate with the defense of 
human and individual rights was incorporated and attained.174 
 
In March of 1995 the first high-level visit to Hungary by 
the Ohio National Guard leadership was made under the Ohio-
Hungary State Partnership Program.  The Ohio delegation met with 
the US Embassy personnel, Hungarian Ministry of Defense, the 
Hungarian Home Defense Forces, and the Ministry of Civil Defense 
HQs. The first MLT Chief and his Traveling Contact Team (TCT) was 
established and a monthly/bimonthly contact arrangement was 
agreed upon. The benefits of a reserve force and a strong NCO 
corps were the major topics for discussion. The cost 
effectiveness of a reserve component compared to a regular unit 
was stressed. 
 
To shore up the foundation of the Ohio-Hungary relationship, 
the following topics/goals were covered on future FAM visits by 
Hungarian delegations to Ohio: 
• Mobilization: The basic principles, personnel and 
equipment, methods of mobilization and how to include the 
private sector. 
• Recruitment: The organizational structure of the reserve 
forces, the legal statutes and the sustainment of 
training 
                                                 
174 Ibid.  
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• Personnel Management:  Automated Management software, 
Career Management for NATO interoperability, the 
accreditation of military educational institutions. 
• Formal/Informal NCO advisory groups and the idea of an 
Inspector General System for Oversight. 
• Hungarian/English language school established under PFP, 
with the goal to send guest lecturers from the State of 
Ohio to assist in teaching Americanized English. 
• Peacekeeping Capability Development: Ohio would provide 
curriculum materials, OPLANs format, and US/NATO maps.175 
 
These core concepts set the framework for a successful 
future relationship and partnership program. The next step was to 
inculcate the Hungarian defense leadership about the unique 
civil-military relationship the Guard has within their state. 
Four Senior Military leaders came Ohio to gain an appreciation of 
both civil control of the military and the military support to 
authorities. The leaders not only visited military installations 
but went to State and Federal Agencies, Ohio local governments 
and various community organizations to gather information on how 
the military interacts with, and provides support to the 
community and the state.  
 
In many of the FAM events, the organizational structure and 
the relationship that the Ohio National Guard has with the 
Federal government was emphasized. This concept of answering to 
the President and the Governor is a complex issue that needed 
much clarification. The federal and state missions and how both 
are accomplished with the various roles and missions of the 
National Guard is crucial to understanding how this once local 
militia, expanded into a federal mission.176 
  
                                                 
175  SPP Summary 1995-1996, Compilation of all After Action Reports for 1995-
1996. 
176  After Action Report H-HU432 13-20 January 1996. 
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D.  TARGETED TRAINING EVENTS 
 
A year later, after the foundation had been laid, more 
timely and specialized topics were approached.  Ohio hosted Mid-
Senior level Budapest Military District officers to become 
familiar with the principles and practices in the prevention of 
terrorism and sabotage on US Army Installation and response to 
mass disasters in large cities. Briefings, demonstrations, and 
methods training was included as well as visits to the Ohio 
Emergency Management Agency to show how the military works in 
conjunction with state agencies. 
  
 1. Hungarian Air Defense 
 
One of the most successful aspects of the Hungarian-Ohio 
mil-to-mil contacts is in the scope of air defense.  The 
Hungarian Air Defense Command began its familiarization training 
in order to promote standardization and interoperability in 1996. 
The Hungarian Air Field of Taszar was used extensively as a 
forward operating base in Former Yugoslavian Conflict. 
 
2.  Guard Exercises 
  
In 1996, Ohio participated in two Guard Ex events. One of 
the purposes of these events was to ensure that the delegations 
were kept at the worker level and not just upper echelon tours. 
The events concentrated on Army Engineer Lanes training and 
stressed NATO interoperability and civil protection issues. The 
Guard was able to conduct its mobilization training, deployment 
and redeployment in real world operations. The other event was an 
Air Guard Ex in which the Hungarian delegation, led by Col. 
Jozsef Babos, Head of Air Craft Deployment HHDF, came to Ohio to 
observe the preparation and training by the OHANG to deploy and 
operate in sustained peacekeeping operations. Both events were 
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productive and were considered a successful start of training for 
future operations and capabilities. When one looks at Annex D, 
the Hungary ODC 5-Year Plan, Goal 1.4, Support to International 
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) has been achieved. Hungary now has 
the ability to prepare for PKO, draft lessons learned, enter into 
negotiations for an Acquisition and Cross-Service agreement and 
have developed units specifically trained for PKO according to 
Western standards.177 
  
3. Reorganization of HDF 
  
As a nation in transition, Hungary was in the midst of not 
only overhauling its military doctrine, strategy and structure, 
it also had to reduce its force structure. The National Guard not 
only was able to help the HHDF make crucial decisions in 
reorganization, it is also a model of how a reserve component can 
supplement the large standing army which is obsolete for 
Hungarian national defense. In August of 1996 the Chief of the 
HHDF Mobilization Department, his colleagues and senior officers 
from the Operations Department of Budapest Central Command came 
to Ohio to learn about a standing reserve force. The planned 
topics were a review of the structure of the NGB MOB Division, 
planning and budgeting for large scale wartime operations, system 
call up and lessons learned form Desert Storm and Operation Joint 
Endeavor.178  But the venue was changed due to large scale 
flooding of the Ohio River. What makes this so interesting is 
that the visiting Hungarian delegation got to witness firsthand 
the role that the National Guard plays in civilian disaster 
control and relief and it was a live example of National Guard 
Support to Civilian Authorities. 
 
                                                 
177  Lt Col Thomas Brown, USAF Chief of Bilateral Affairs, Annex D, Bilateral 
Affairs Officer for FY)# Hungary ODC 5-Year Plan.   
178  After Action Report, HU581, 8-14 September, 1996. 
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As Hungary was preparing for NATO integration, an apparent 
shortcoming was the interoperability of command post technology 
and operations.  To address this, the Guard conducted several 
events covering the Planning and conduct of a U.S. Corps and 
Division level command post exercises using CPX (Computer Aided 
Exercise). These events included briefings, discussions and 
exchanges of manuals, hardware/software requirements and 
databases and other necessary data to assist the HHDF Operations 
Directorate and the Operations and Training Directorate of the 
Aviation Central Directorate to establish a command post that 
will be interoperable with NATO standards.179 
 
4. Chaplaincy Familiarization Events 
 
 Though the technical training, operational training and 
strategic reorganization of the HDF is the primary focus of mil-
to-mil events, further contact and interaction was conducted by 
the Chaplaincy of the Ohio Guard. Exchanges took place between 
the Hungarian Chief Chaplains and U.S. Chaplains covering topics 
of troop and family religious programs and the relationship of 
unit commanders and chaplains for promoting moral values and 
education. Also included was the unique relationship and 
collaboration of chaplains, human service providers, and military 
community support agencies in assisting commanders with the 
responsibilities for the welfare and morale of not only the 
troops but their families as well. Some lessons learned on this 
visit were:  
• 
                                                
Prior concepts from the past are hard to overcome. 
Chaplains took the place of political officers so the 
stigma remained. Therefore, military bishops were 
reluctant to do extensive training with their chaplains, 
i.e. parachute training or training that would indicate 
 
179  After Action Report, HU657(TCT), 22 January, 1997. 
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Religious tradition goes much deeper in Hungary than in 
Ohio, therefore it is important not to force or impose 
American chaplain values on the Hungarian Chaplains.  
Respect the organizational differences between the two.180   
 
Since it was a former member of the Warsaw Pact, the HDF did 
not have much experience with information sharing to the media 
and general public.  Shortcomings in information dissemination, 
especially during a crisis were identified. In April of 1997 a 
Hungarian delegation came to Ohio to get briefings about, and 
training on the incorporation of public relation assets when 
dealing with the civilian population during natural or industrial 
disasters. Topics included the establishment of an independent 
information system during and emergency; mobilization of 
volunteers for disaster relief and the methods of interagency 
procedure and actions during disasters. 
 
Areas identified for improvement were the need form more 
individual initiative, and flexibility of response. The need to 
privatize many services such as the national ambulance service. 
But Hungary had taken the initiative and was in the forefront of 
regional development and cooperation of all nations for mutual 
support during catastrophic events.181  
  
As the mil-to-mil contacts prove to be successful, the 
commitment to the human side of the partnership grew as well. 
 
 
180  Kenneth Daft, STARC Chaplain, After Action Report  AGOH-CH, 23 April 1997,  
p. 2. 
181  Ralph Green JR. LTC  OHARNG Support Officer, AGOH-OT-MS , May 1997, p. 2. 
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It is the human contact that makes this program unique and 
valuable, one must not forget that there is a human inside of the 
uniform.182 
  
E.  GOALS AND OBJECTIVES: ACHIEVED 
 
 
                                                
The Joint Contact Team Program has changed its mission in 
Hungary as the military and governmental organizations have 
successfully established systems in almost all functional areas 
addressed in the JCTP/ODC/Hungarian Government goals.  
 
These systems are not necessarily the U.S. way of doing 
business, but modern and efficient methods of 
performing those functions and tasks determined to be 
mission essential.183  
 
The goal was the successful implementation made evident when 
the Hungarian government and military have institutionalized and 
adopted as Hungarian doctrine the basic principles of a modern, 
well trained and equipped NATO style military, properly 
configured to support Hungarys national defense and security 
objectives. 
 
Though Hungary has achieved its goal of NATO membership the 
process continues for the restructuring of forces and meeting 
NATO requirements. After reviewing After Action Reports and 
Feedback from Host Nation members, the HDF has determined that 
they are sufficiently familiar with the U.S. logistic procedures 
and interoperability with NATO members during deployments. As 
part of the ongoing training, the familiarization of the HDF Air 
Forces with U.S. Combat fighter operations continues as well as 
training in combat fighter doctrine and mission operations. 
Simultaneously, the familiarization of the HDF IRF/RRF with U.S. 
 
182  Interview with László Bojtos, Honory Hungarian Consulate, conducted by 
Major Tibor Babos and Major Linda Royer in Cleveland Ohio, November 03, 
2002. 
183  LTC Brown, Annex D, Paragraph 3. 
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Brigade/regimental, battalion and company leadership and command 
tasks, focusing the functions of key leadership positions, 
including the senior staff NCO positions persists. Command and 
Control requirements have not reached a satisfactory level of 
interoperability and training continues with the HDF 
familiarization with unit exercise and simulation processes 
intended to assist key HDF/ IRF/RRF units with demonstrating 
common U.S./HDF staff and decision-making processes through 
integration with the U.S. exercise simulation.184 
 
The effects of September 11th have highlighted the need to 
increase the defensive capabilities of units against the risks of 
the spread of weapons of mass destruction, to include individual 
and collective NBC defense tasks. But it seems that there has not 
been much consideration for the Air Force or the Border Guards in 
current planning.185 Part of this training was to familiarize the 
HDF 25th Mechanized Brigade with the U.S. Army mechanized unit 
NBC doctrine and procedures. 
 
Where the goal of stability is concerned, Hungary has been 
able to reduce the number of border disagreements, and develop a 
plan for border security. They have developed and coordinated an 
international and regional disaster relief plan/system. A 
regional environmental protection plan has also been implemented 
to further security initiatives. Regarding the establishment of a 
force structure that is adequate for the defensive needs of the 
host nation and adjustment to the existing forces to Objective 
force structure, the JCTP contribution is assessed as complete, 
yet Hungary is still working with other U.S. programs. A 
significant accomplishment of the JCTP/SPP is its input to 
Hungarys ongoing development of a National Defense Concept 
(strategy). Lastly, Hungary has proven its commitment to Western 
                                                 
184  After Action Report HU657, 8-12 December. 
185  LTC Brown, Annex D, Appendix 1, Goal 5.5. 
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standards by successfully achieving compliance with regional arms 
control agreements and treaties.  
  
Pertaining to Democratization, all the goals set forth by 
the JCTP and SPP have been achieved. A non-political military, 
subordinated to a democratically elected civilian political 
leadership has been established. Compliance with the National and 
International Rules of Law have been firmly incorporated while 
improvements have been made with civil-military cooperation. 
 
A major strength of the SPP is it focus on human relations, 
and military professionalism. Though hard to measure, the goal 
for increase respect for human dignity and individual rights of 
service members has been met.186 To measure this progress, the 
Guard had several key objectives to be accessed. The HDF 
implemented ethical and moral leadership standards and developed 
a plan to ensure the tolerance for ethnic, generational and 
religious diversity among its service members. To help monitor 
this progress, the HDF created an inspector general system to 
help revolve service members complaints and conduct routine 
inspections. Another achievement in which the Guard was 
instrumental was the beginning of a vigorous Professional NCO 
Corps. The recruitment of quality individuals who are educated 
and trained in leadership and decision making skills as NCO is a 
ground breaking accomplishment for the HDF. 
 
 These achieved goals and objectives are a credit to the 
Hungarian people, both civilian and military. Change is never 
easy: 
And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing 
more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to 
conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take 
the lead in the introduction of the new order of 
things. Because the innovator has for enemies all those 
                                                 
186  After Action Report, Military Law Familiarization, HU396,  Dated 30 Jan- 
04 February 1995. 
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who have done well under the old conditions, and how 
lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the 
new.  The coolness arise partly from fear of the 
opponents, who have the laws on their sides, and partly 
from the incredulity of men, who do not really believe 
in the new things until they have long experienced 
them.187 
  
The Ohio National Guard has been instrumental in guiding her 
Partner Hungary on this journey of democratization, 
Westernization and NATO integration. But Ohio has gained much 
from her experience as well.  By offering its Guard and 
Reservists the opportunity to train in a real world environment 
and operate in multinational coalition forces, the SPP program 
has been invaluable. Post JCTP engagement continues to involve 
exercises, training exchanges, personnel attendance at U.S. 
military schools and participation in multinational peace 
operations as well as other long-term activities such as Security 
Assistance. The U.S. Ambassador to Hungary places high value in 
continuous engagement of the National Guard/State Program and the 
Ohio National Guard in fulfillment of U.S. objectives and 
Hungarian Security interests.188 
 
F.  ASSESSMENT OF THE OHIO SPP 
 
The program is winding down and major events are dropping 
off. In part this is the life cycle of a successful SPP program.  
Overall the Ohio Hungarian Partnership is a success and many 
newly formed partnerships can look to the Ohio-Hungarian 
relationship as a model for developing their own programs.  But 
not only can one learn from the success of others, there are 
lessons to be learned from failures or shortcomings. 
  
When reviewing several years of after-action reports it 
becomes clear that there is too much emphasis on familiarization 
                                                 
187  Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, (New York, New American Library), p. 48. 
188  LTC Brown, Annex D. 
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training that does not provides any concrete or quantifiable 
results. While one can argue that just developing trust and 
understanding between two cultures is a major component of this 
program and cant be measured, one can seek out other sorts of 
events that involve specific training or more quantifiable 
objectives.  
 
A very basic and fundamental obstacle to growth and 
integration of the Hungarian Defense Forces is Hungarys 
Strategic Plan, or lack thereof. Add to this shortcoming is that 
fact that there is no NATO plan for Hungary. Could the Ohio Guard 
have been more proactive in helping Hungary develop it Strategic 
Plan?  Hungary, now a NATO member is being criticized for lagging 
behind in its growth toward full integration and Ohio could be 
instrumental is helping Hungary regain the momentum that it had 
while trying to achieve membership into the organization.  
 
Along with the fact that too many events were centered 
around familiarization, from another trend that should be 
addressed is the personnel that attend these events.  It is 
apparent that many of the same personnel of the same rank or even 
the same people themselves attended multiple events. There is a 
lack in diversity of ranks and people that took advantage of the 
program, especially in its early years. 
 
An ongoing obstacle is the language barrier. Even after 
almost a decade there is still not sufficient preparation by the 
HDF for English training and the Ohio Guard makes no effort to 
provide even some basic Hungarian language skills to those who 
participate in this program on a regular basis. 
 
The area that the Guard can make a significant impact is in 
aiding the HDF to develop its NCO Corps.  There have been several 
events concerning this, but as Hungary prepares to end 
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conscription, it needs to continue to grow its NCO development 
program and follow the Guards lead in utilizing this valuable 
human resource.   
 
 As the military-to-military events drop off in numbers, the 
civilian to-civilian events are picking up numbers and in diverse 
areas. Various civilian exchanges have taken place in 2002 and 
more are planned for 2003.  The areas of exchange are at the 
State Governmental level with the Minister of Interior, the 
Ministry of Education with the Ohio State University and events 
planned for fire and police forces.189 
 
 
                                                
Due to its success, Hungarys State Partnership Program has 
been reduced to being manned by a one-person shop who works in 
the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC). The ODC is a component 
of the ECJ4-ID in respective host nations in USEUCOM AOR and is 
charged with implementing Security Cooperation guidance and 
programs. 
 
The SPP has continued to be a particularly effective 
advocate for democratic ideals and the civilian control of the 
military. The Ohio Guard has provided Hungary with a concrete 
concept of the citizen-soldier and has fostered a lasting 
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VI. DEVELOPMENT PROSPECT 
 
Partner nations pursue very different objectives within 
the Partnership. Some seek to improve their 
capabilities, with a view to eventual membership of the 
Alliance. For others, the Partnership is an 
institutional door to the Euro-Atlantic community. () 
But, irrespective of these different aspirations, there 
is still considerable unused potential in the 
Partnership, particularly in the area of crisis 
management, the better use of the EAPC, and practical 
ooperation under PfP.190 c
 
A.  DIAGNOSIS 
 
The threat of large scale confrontation has dropped 
considerably since the end of the Cold War, but there are 
numerous other challenges that shade the Euro-Atlantic region. 
All of the actors of the region stand at the crossroads and must 
choose the right path to meet challenges and secure a peaceful 
future.  Concerning ways to achieve peace, partnership and 
cooperation, the PfP and SPP have to face new realities. 
 
The enhanced and more operational Partnership will 
continue to address the full range of objectives laid 
out in the 1994 PfP Framework Document. It will also 
introduce new quality and character to Partnership, in 
part to reflect the increased scope and more 
operational nature of PfP resulting from the enhanced 
process.191 
 
There is no doubt that the achievements of PfP and SPP, 
involving both the Allies and Partners of Central and Eastern 
Europe, has become one of the main pillars of the politico-
military cooperation in the Trans-Atlantic region. The programs 
                                                 
190  Dahinden Martin, Swiss Security Policy and Partnership with NATO, NATO 
Review, Web Edition, Vol. 47  No. 4, Winter, 1999, pp. 24-28, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9904-06.htm (19 January 2003) 
191  Report by the Political Military Steering Committee on PfP, Towards a 
Partnership for the 21st Century, The Enhanced and More Operational 
Partnership, June 15 1999, § 8., 
http://www.southeasteurope.org/documents(d990615a.htm (22 April 2003) 
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have been recognized as the most useful tool and forum in 
enhancing security, stability and most importantly democracy in 
the former communist countries. In retrospect the  progress made 
and the overall vitality of the East-West cooperation and 
partnership in political, military, economic, societal and other 
sectors has gone far beyond any optimistic expectations of the 
early 1990s.  
 
As one of the main pillars of the NATO strategy, PfP is not 
just a forum of the East-West cooperation but also one of the 
most powerful a generator of the bilateral, multilateral and 
regional cooperation of the involving members, from Vancouver to 
Vladivostok. Furthermore, for those Partners, who intend to join 
the Alliance, PfP serves as a practical institution for 
exercising practical capabilities, and offers country specific 
and tailored direction for developing and reviewing integration 
plans and determining objectives. 
 
The momentum produced by PfP and SPP therefore should not to 
be allowed to erode or die. The development should be 
consolidated in the European security architecture. The 
enlargement of NATO is essential for carrying on that process and 
benefits that have already been gained. Also the enlargement 
should be ongoing and the Prague commitment to that effect should 
be developed further. But at the next wave if the integration, a 
simple statement that the door should remain open might not be 
enough for those aspirants, who were invited in Prague. All of 
the aspirants should seek a guaranteed support from the Alliance 
for continued openness. To that end, the idea of continuing the 
intensified dialogue between NATO and candidates is definitely 
the only way to be able to handle the dilemma of enlargement.  
 
Regarding the issue of NATO integration, the focus shifted 
from PfP to the MAP initiative. With this is mind, NATOs PfP and 
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the MAP initiative gives a framework, forum, structure and is a 
guide for nations to remain transparent and objective. 
Maintenance of the credibility of the Alliance and the thus of 
the enlargement process requires a review the lessons learned 
from the first four years of the MAP process. In order to be able 
to design for the future, as well as to communicate these 
conclusions and conceptual ideas both to the Allies and 
Aspirants. Due to the dynamic political imperative to bring about 
a qualitative advancement in the current NATO integration 
process, and in order to help improve capabilities of the 
candidates to gradually comply with the requirements of the 
membership, there is a need for a more effective and operational 
procedure to avoid any redundant theological debate.  
 
Experiences gathered in the recent accession process so far 
has already proved the value of designing the MAP structure and 
outlining how NATO aspirants can help themselves. There is an 
obvious and justified expectation towards the three Central 
European NATO members to take a prominent, active and leading 
role in the current integration process of carrying the MAP 
initiative forward and make it stronger. 
 
Croatias joining the MAP process in March 2002 highlights 
the need to lay out the modalities of and procedures for 
accession to the MAP. There must be a balance between the 
declared openness for any country in the EAPC/PfP framework who 
is joining the process to ensure its smooth integration as well 
as preventing the MAP from losing is its pragmatic nature or 
allowing for any degradation of the process. 
 
The PfP, SPP and MAP engagement programs have proven to be 
fruitful for Hungary. But this is just the foundation for Hungary 
to take on new roles and meet the new challenges of the Euro-
Atlantic and even global security environment.  
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B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The recommendations are addressed both to the Alliance and 
its related initiatives and members, the PfP and the MAP 





a. General Issues 
 
 In general, there are six main principles guiding 
NATO's partnerships, that were addressed by Lord Robertson at the 
first MAP Ministerial Meeting in Sofia, 2000, and each of these 
principles translates into a clear objective. 
 
 First and foremost, the Partnership should be as broad 
and inclusive as possible. Through the Partnership for Peace 
Programme, and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, NATO has to 
preserve the role of a dynamo at the hub of a new set of profound 
security relationships across the continent. In other words 
through PfP and EAPC, security across Europe has now been 
oriented towards inclusion and cooperation. 
 
 The second principle of the Partnership is that it 
should be flexible. With so many countries in Europe -- some old 
democracies, some new, and all with different security traditions 
and backgrounds -- nothing else would be expedient.  PfP and EAPC 
are designed to accommodate these different needs and different 
speeds.   
 
  The third principle is that it should be focused on 
definable objectives. Successful partnership with some countries 
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requires special relationships, because of their political 
importance, or the extent of the cooperation both parties desire. 
That is why NATO has unique relationships with Russia and 
Ukraine. Both countries occupy important strategic positions in 
Europe and their evolution have a profound affect on European 
security and stability.  
 
 The fourth principle of the Partnership is that it 
should be practical. It must be more than a talk shop. It must 
also prepare all participants to work together when it counts, 
and where it counts -- on the ground, managing and preventing 
crises. 
 
 The fact that some countries are more ready and willing 
to make a contribution to Euro-Atlantic security lies at the 
heart of the fifth principle of partnership:  that the 
Partnership must not only broaden, but also be deepened.  In 
other words, the Partnership must offer, for some, the road to 
full membership into NATO. 
 
  A set of values and principles related to the 
Partnership are explicitly important to deepen and strengthen 
cooperation. These include a shared recognition that: 
 
1. A mutual and individual benefit must be strengthened in 
order to deepen successful partnership, although specific 
benefits will be tailored to each partner. 
2. Decision-making in relation to activities within the 
Partnership must be shared more and issues arising from 
implementation of partnership activities must be negotiated 
and renegotiated to the satisfaction of both all Partners 
and Allies 
3. Flexibility and openness to new ideas coming from both 
Allies and Partners on the part of all partners should 
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further enhance the success of the partnership toward 
meeting its shared objectives 
4. Active and open communication, maximizing national, 
institutional and personal contact, and a more progressive 
on-going mutual problem solving approach between the members 
is necessary in order to maintain and develop a shared 
understanding and mutually agreeable goals 
5. The partnership must remain accountable both to national and 
international values 
6. Project processes must remain explicitly sensitive to the 
future development potential of the PfP. 
 
b. Specific Issues 
 
 For the further development of PfP policies, the 
consultation mechanisms should be increased and streamlined at 
the highest level of EAPC and NATO committees (NAC, SPCR [Senior 
Political Committee Reinforced], PMSC [Political-Military 
Steering Committee], MCWG [Military Committee Working Group]). 
Civil-military relations, democratic control and defense 
planning, and political-military activities should be further 
developed and implemented in these committees and strengthen the 
19+1 or all or appropriate consultations. 
 
 The PARP should be more operational and enhanced as 
well. New apparatus should be introduced to give Partners more 
opportunities to active participation in the joint decision-
making procedure in all elements of PfP. Whenever partners have 
any problem in defense planning, the responsible NATO committees 
should deal with them and make realistic recommendations and 
provide necessary assistance when able.  
 
 With the further development and harmonization of both 
planning procedures to extend and synchronize with EUs Headline 
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Goals (HG) and Capability Development Mechanism, the Euro-
Atlantic force planning is aimed at reaching a brand new, 
interoperable and transparent cycle, in which the PARP is an 
equal pillar. 
 
 There needs to be more official political and military 
representation for Partners at Brussels and other regional and 
sub-regional headquarters in order to providing for greater 
involvement of partners at all levels and have input into the 
decision-making process. 
 
 The PfP should be more integrated. By developing PfP 
Staff Elements concept, PfP bodies should focus more on military 
operations. By this way, partners could contribute to the PfP 
missions at NATO headquarters. 
  
 In addition, regarding the military issues, 
consultations should be deepened, including all points of view 
during the early stages of decision-making aimed at reaching the 
maximum degree of interoperability and common understanding. NATP 
partners should be conferred with more in the shaping of 
decisions and joint planning, whenever appropriate or possible.    
    
2. SPP 
 
What makes SPP so valuable is its ability to focus the 
attention of a small sector of the Department of Defense (the 
State National Guard) on a single nation to foster engagement and 
grow cooperation. 
 
The optimum SPP partnership is one which the Host-Nation 
professes genuine interest in Partnership; U.S. and Theatre 
engagement objectives are satisfied; the force Protection risk is 
low; a minimum of additional resources is required to execute 
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engagement and National Guard core engagement competencies, 
particularly military support to civil authority (MSCA) are 
heavily incorporated.192 
 
In order for SPP to reach its full potential there are 
several important criteria to be considered: 
 
1. Reasonable objectives and goals that are clear to both the 
Host-Nation and the partner state. 
2. The Guard should focus mil-to-mil contact that is already 
active. The citizen-soldier concept and civilian control of 
the military is something unheard of in many counties. The 
SPP should not be the first to set up mil-to-mil contact but 
should model the soldier who is a civilian from all sectors 
of society and is ready to deploy as a military force. 
3. Exchanges of individuals and small teams is crucial. There 
needs to be more long-term exchanges. 
4. Small units or functional areas should perform their fifteen 
day Annual Training in their partner country. This 
interaction will help prepare the Guard for fighting in 
coalition forces. 
5. Conversely, the partner nations could send its 
units/functional areas to Annual Training events in the U.S. 
This would increase military inter-operability and foster 
mutual trust. 
 
Finally, the SPP has developed relationships that go beyond 
military engagement and have entered the civilian sector. 
Government officials, business partners, educators, medical 
experts and State and local government agencies have all 
participated in FAM events and have created a momentum of their 
own. Even Guardsmen, who are members of social, religious and 
                                                 
192   Oliveria, LtCol Bruce, The Citizen Soldier in the United Security 
Calculus, The United States Army War College, Carlise Barracks, PA, 2001, 
p. 14. 
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community organizations can extend their relationships beyond the 
scope of the military. When this begins to happen, the SPP can be 
confident that it has been successful in its goal of helping 




If the democratic states of the Euro-Atlantic region want to 
join NATO; if they are able and willing to contribute to the 
security of the Alliance; and if their membership in NATO  
enhances Euro-Atlantic security; then the Alliance must remain 
flexible enough to consider their membership.  Indeed, for these 
countries, membership is simply the logical step for regional 
security and ever-deeper partnership. 
 
The Alliance should express its encouragement as well as the 
stipulate its actual objectives and draw conclusions from the 
previous accession and current process to aspirants in a clear 
but positive manner. Positive reinforcement is necessary to help 
NATO candidates grapple with the complex and comprehensive 
process. However, candidates must know that the NATO integration 
process is not a beauty contest where changes are made on the 
surface and advance grades are given that will guarantee 
membership in foreseeable future. Instead, the aspirants need to 
understand that efficient and active assistance can only be 
provided to them in to increase their readiness if they are 
absolutely honest and open about their problems and deficiencies. 
 
 It is therefore essential to prepare carefully specific 
country assessments, with inputs from the Allies. In order to 
ensure that these inputs are as beneficial and efficient as 
possible, NATO must determine in a more specific manner, the 
scope and format of its assessments. The Alliance could be more 
specific on presenting these assessments and its conclusions 
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presented in a more easily understood method to the aspirant 
country concerned. Both sides need to realize that when dealing 
with the process, to be as specific as possible in order to avoid 
mechanical copying of other existing procedures. The Alliance 
should be unambiguous about highlighting what NATO sees as the 
most pressing problems aspirants have to overcome during the 
preparation phase. This might be done in a general, all 
encompassing manner to all the ten candidates together by 
highlighting the most common problems they face, as well as in a 
country-specific manner, on an individual basis. 
 
Together the Alliance and the member states should develop 
some conceptual advice and suggestions to aspirant countries on 
how to comply with expectations and requirements for membership. 
This plan should line up with the self- differentiating and self 
selective approach, which is indirectly offered by the MAP 
document as guidance. Advice given by the Allies are must be 
helpful, but not bind the aspirants, even if they seem like 
imperatives. 
 
One of the most important issues is the feedback mechanism. 
Assistance and feedback should not be limited to the formal 
meetings foreseen in the actual cycle, but also be provided in 
substance in the framework of conferences, seminars, workshops 
and other meetings with the responsible NATO bodies. In order to 
make this mechanism more effective, NATO and its Allies should be 
ready to share responsibilities and guide the individual aspirant 
countries. This should be an open forum for information sharing 
and problem-solving.   
 
In order to consolidate the preparation process, NATO should 
continue to rely on the experiences gathered in the machinery 
established by the PfP, especially in the EMOP framework, but 
also make sure that the two process not to be confused. Any 
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indication to reduce PfP or the bilateral SPP, to incorporate 
such experience and mechanisms by any mere hint of categorizing 
PfP members according to status vis-á-vis membership would be 
definitely fatal politically. In addition, candidate countries 
should be made to understand that participation in the general 
framework of PfP and SPP should not be neglected once membership 
is achieved. Following accession they are expected to play the 
same active and increasingly donor-type role in the framework of 
PfP, as Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland have now. 
 
In summary, there is still an immediate need to establish 
common guidelines for both Allies and NATO that uses the 
experiences of the past aspirants and transmit the right 
messages to the present aspirants. The Allies and the responsible 
NATO bodies should better communicate the relevant elements of 
the assessments on annual cycles that correspond with the ANPs of 
the aspirants and to suggest guidelines for the future. Both the 
Alliance and the candidates should focus on and establish the 
formula and other important details of  MAP negotiations, 
workshops and experts opinions about the other elements of the 
MAP process in order to be focus on the most relevant issues. And 
last but not least. the Alliance must develop its feedback 
mechanism, most importantly amongst Allies as well as toward 
partners, to be able monitor the weakest points of the chain, 
and prioritize priorities. 
 
The following aspects to be emphasized in the further 
process of preparations: 
• Every country wishing to be a serious candidate for 
membership needs to be credible and reliable. This 
requires each aspirant to formulate goals and timetables 
in a manner that is mindful of these goals and how to  
implement them. This requires resources, human and 
financial ones. This, also requires aspirants to set 
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clear priorities in the process of designing and further 
developing preparations for membership, because it is 
impossible to move forward in all fields at the same 
pace. Experience so far has shown that not each and 
every requirement, in terms of compatibility and 
interoperability, will have to be met by the date of 
accession. De facto integration is a process that will 
have to continue after the country in question has 
acceded to the Alliance. 
• It is therefore essential to keep the requirement of 
feasibility, especially in financial terms - into 
account. In this context, it is important to point out 
that NATO made clear in the course of Hungarys 
accession, is that the Alliance did not wish to 
economically overburden and jeopardize the social peace 
and economy of its future members. It stressed that at 
times, less can be more. However, the priorities 
considered as most essential will have to be met and 
will have to be funded with the necessary financial and 
other means. 
• One essential factor of the reliability of a future NATO 
member is openness. Countries must therefore not be 
reluctant to reveal where they are having the most 
difficulty and where they need particular advice and 
assistance.  
• Another factor in terms of reliability of the Alliance 
is the extent and durability for domestic support - both 
among political parties and the broader public opinion, 
indeed of the country as a whole. It is important for 
aspirant countries to ensure that there is a convincing 
public majority supporting NATO and its policies. 
However, this task will not end once a country has 
become a fully-fledged member of the Alliance. 
Reliability of an Ally and therefore its standing and 
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respect within the Alliance will depend on its ability 
to maintain a strong support for NATO and its policies 
long after it has become a member - and especially in 
times of crisis. Communication must remain proactive and 
open. 
• Experiences of the communication process proves that 
different segments of society need different messages in 
order to be convinced of the necessity of NATO-
membership. It is therefore essential to identify the 
target groups and their current attitudes to the issue 
and to work out a detailed strategy especially for those 
who seem to be most doubtful or opposed to NATO and 
accession to the Alliance.  
• Experiences and impressions gathered in the framework of 
the MAP process show that the stability of democracy 
will be taken into consideration when deciding whether 
continuity of pro-Euro-Atlantic, constructive democratic 
policies will remain immune to any change of government. 
This is one essential prerequisite from the point of 
view of reliability of an ally-to-be. Enhancement of 
democracy and of human rights, including minority rights 
will continue to be monitored. 
• From the point of view of external policies, maturity 
and reliability of a future ally will also be judged by 
its commitment to and progress in developing friendly 
and co-operative relations with all countries, and with 
neighboring countries in particular. Its commitment to 
and involvement in multilateral efforts aiming at 
enhancing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic 
region and in crisis-torn regions in particular will 
also be taken into consideration.  
• To turn to defense and military-related issues, the 
issue of compatibility and interoperability is a key. 
For the military, this means that every potentially 
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would need to have properly trained experts - civilians 
and military - in the respective positions. This in turn 
requires an adequate system of education and personnel 
management, to ensure that the right people are assigned 
to the right places with the right equipment. 
• Finally the issue of downsizing in order to have an 
armed force smaller in numbers but that is more 
efficient is an essential goal. Such a process needs to 
be a intricate approach - taking into account such 
sensitive issues as having to make a professional 
military career must at least offer a financial 
incentives without the negative social implications of 




The links between NATO and its Partners must be further 
enhanced. Kosovo and other Peacekeeping operations have 
demonstrated, in very practical terms, the importance and 
relevance of the PfP and SPP. Partner Nations gave significant 
political support during the air campaign and now most of them  
are participants on the ground in implementing peace. This shows 
that PfP and EAPC and SPP are valuable tools of transatlantic 
security.  
 
After Kosovo and September 11th the Partnership went beyond 
ceremonial matters. The most emerging question now is that how 
the Alliance can further enhance the PfP to improve further 
interoperability in planning and conducting NATO-led operations 
and deepening cooperation.  
 
Both in political and military terms it is time to redefine 
or even recreate the role of the PfP, and SPP for nations who 
have entered NATO, which might be developed alongside with the 
existing ones. Indeed, it is an emerging task for the Allies and 
Partners to direct possible developments of these engagement 
programs for the 21st Century, which has shaped the security 
environment yet, and where the real operational quality covering 
a broad spectrum of missions instead of politico-military 
cooperation.  
    
In the New Europe, geography is no longer a nations 
destiny. Therefore, the Alliance needs to extend the invitation 
of membership help the aspirants better prepare themselves for 
eventual membership.  PfP and SPP are especially designed for 
this purpose. Of course, this applies to all of NATO's 
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relationships, but today, it is most relevant to the Partnership 
within NATO: the transatlantic relationship. 
 
This is truly the foundation of Euro-Atlantic security. 
Europe and North America together remain the foundation of global 
stability, the engine of the world's economy, and the nexus of 
technological innovation. The United States and Europe represent 
the world's strongest community of like minded nations: not only 
are they successful democracies, but are also outward-looking, 
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